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The neuromodulator dopamine is centrally involved in reward, approach behavior,
exploration, and various aspects of cognition. Variations in dopaminergic function appear
to be associated with variations in personality, but exactly which traits are influenced by
dopamine remains an open question. This paper proposes a theory of the role of dopamine
in personality that organizes and explains the diversity of findings, utilizing the division of
the dopaminergic system into value coding and salience coding neurons (Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010). The value coding system is proposed to be related primarily to Extraversion
and the salience coding system to Openness/Intellect. Global levels of dopamine influence
the higher order personality factor, Plasticity, which comprises the shared variance of
Extraversion and Openness/Intellect. All other traits related to dopamine are linked to
Plasticity or its subtraits. The general function of dopamine is to promote exploration,
by facilitating engagement with cues of specific reward (value) and cues of the reward
value of information (salience). This theory constitutes an extension of the entropy model
of uncertainty (EMU; Hirsh et al., 2012), enabling EMU to account for the fact that
uncertainty is an innate incentive reward as well as an innate threat. The theory accounts
for the association of dopamine with traits ranging from sensation and novelty seeking,
to impulsivity and aggression, to achievement striving, creativity, and cognitive abilities, to
the overinclusive thinking characteristic of schizotypy.
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Personality neuroscience is an interdisciplinary approach to
understanding mechanisms in the brain that produce relatively
stable patterns of behavior, motivation, emotion, and cogni-
tion that differ among individuals (DeYoung and Gray, 2009;
DeYoung, 2010b). Dopamine, a broadly acting neurotransmit-
ter, is one of the most studied and theorized biological entities
in personality neuroscience. Dopamine acts as a neuromodulator;
relatively small groups of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain
extend axons through much of the frontal cortex, medial tem-
poral lobe, and basal ganglia, where dopamine release influences
the function of local neuronal populations. Despite the extensive
attention paid to dopamine in personality neuroscience, no com-
prehensive theory exists regarding its role in personality, and it has
been implicated in traits ranging from extraversion to aggression
to intelligence to schizotypy.
The present article attempts to develop a unifying theory to
explain dopamine’s apparently diverse influences on personal-
ity, linking it to all traits that reflect variation in processes of
exploration. Exploration is defined as any behavior or cognition
motivated by the incentive reward value of uncertainty. (This def-
inition will be explored in more detail below, in the section titled
Exploration, Entropy, and Cybernetics.) Personality traits can be
explained as relatively stable responses to broad classes of stim-
uli (Tellegen, 1981; Gray, 1982; Corr et al., 2013). Personality
traits associated with dopamine, therefore, are posited to be
those that reflect individual differences in incentive responses to
uncertainty.
DOPAMINE AS DRIVER OF EXPLORATION
Before discussing personality traits in detail, it will be necessary to
have a working model of dopaminergic function. In my attempt
to develop a unifying theory of the role of dopamine in person-
ality, I also posit a unifying theory of the function of dopamine
in human information processing. One might think it naïve to
assume that complex neuromodulatory systems have any core
function unifying their diverse processes. Dopamine is involved
in a variety of cognitive and motivational processes; dopamin-
ergic neurons originate in multiple sites in the midbrain; and
dopaminergic axons extend to multiple regions of the striatum,
hippocampus, amygdala, thalamus, and cortex. Finally, there are
five different dopamine receptors, in two classes (D1 and D5 are
D1-type, whereas D2, D3, and D4 are D2-type), with very differ-
ent distributions in the brain. Why should not this diversity have
evolved to serve several independent functions, with no unifying
higher-order function? The simple reason this seems unlikely is
evolutionary path-dependency. If dopamine served a particular
function in a phylogenetically early organism, then it would be
easier for evolution to co-opt the dopaminergic system to per-
form additional functions if they were not incompatible with the
first function, and easier still if the new functions were influ-
enced by some broad selective pressure that also influenced the
older function, which is to say, if they shared some more gen-
eral function. This is because any factor that affects synthesis
of dopamine, whether genetic, metabolic, or dietary/digestive,
is likely to influence all aspects of dopaminergic function, no
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matter how diverse, as it will tend to increase or decrease avail-
able dopamine in all branches of the system. The maintenance of
some overarching consistency of dopaminergic function by evo-
lution is likely because it would avoid conflict between different
branches of the system when global levels of dopamine are raised
or lowered. Note that this is an argument about what is evolu-
tionarily likely, not what is evolutionarily necessary; it is intended
merely as preliminary evidence for the plausibility of the unifying
theory that follows.
The nature of evolutionary path-dependency suggests a hierar-
chical organization of functions of the dopaminergic system. The
different functions carried out by different branches and com-
ponents of the dopaminergic system are posited, in the present
theory, to have one higher-order function in common, and that
function is exploration. The release of dopamine, anywhere in the
dopaminergic system, increases motivation to explore and facili-
tates cognitive and behavioral processes useful in exploration. 1
Different forms of exploration exist, however, and these are
governed by different subsystems of the dopaminergic system.
Further, different branches of the dopaminergic system are likely
to have different effects on different brain regions (e.g., cortical vs.
subcortical regions) in order to adjust neural populations in those
regions to particular functional demands. Thus, the dopamin-
ergic system can be considered to carry out multiple distinct
functions, which may appear extremely diverse or even incom-
patible when considered at the level of specific brain structures,
but which nonetheless possess a larger functional unity.
EXPLORATION, ENTROPY, AND CYBERNETICS
Before providing evidence that this functional unity reflects
exploration, the definition of exploration as “any behavior or cog-
nition motivated by the incentive reward value of uncertainty”
must be explained. To explore is to transform the unknown
into the known or the known into the unknown (Peterson,
1999). More formally, what is unknown is what is uncer-
tain or unpredicted, and what is uncertain or unpredicted can
be defined in terms of psychological entropy 2. The theory I
present here is an extension of the entropy model of uncertainty
(EMU), which posits that anxiety is a response to psychologi-
cal entropy (Hirsh et al., 2012). Entropy is a measure of disorder,
1This claim may raise a red flag for those familiar with the conceptual dis-
tinction between exploration and exploitation (e.g., Frank et al., 2009). In
the section Exploration: Motivation and Emotion Associated with Dopamine,
I argue that exploratory processes, facilitated by dopamine, occur during
behavior typically described as “exploitation.”
2In the decision-making literature, uncertainty is sometimes distinguished
from ambiguity, where uncertainty describes any outcome with a known
probability less than 100% and ambiguity describes events in which the
exact probability of a given outcome is unknown. In the present work, I do
not distinguish uncertainty from ambiguity; situations in which probabilities
are unknown are more uncertain than situations in which probabilities are
known. Further, from the perspective of psychological entropy, a situation can
contain observable uncertainty or ambiguity that is deemed neutral or irrel-
evant and is, therefore, not uncertain from the perspective of the cybernetic
system because it is predicted. For example, one might observe that a particu-
lar event of no consequence takes place with uncertain frequency. That event
would often be treated as minimally (if at all) unpredicted. (Consider, as an
example, the variability in the noises made by one’s refrigerator).
originally developed to describe physical systems (Clausius, 1865;
Boltzmann, 1877) but later generalized to all information sys-
tems (Shannon, 1948). It can be most simply defined as the
number of microstates possible in a given macrostate. For exam-
ple, the entropy of a shuffled deck of cards is a function of
the number of possible sequences of cards in the deck; in con-
trast, the entropy of a new, unopened deck of cards is much
lower, because decks of cards ship with their suits together in
numerical order. Entropy, therefore, describes the amount of
uncertainty or unpredictability in an information system. Human
beings are complex information systems, and, specifically, they
are cybernetic systems—that is, goal-directed, self-regulating sys-
tems (Carver and Scheier, 1998; Peterson and Flanders, 2002;
Gray, 2004; Van Egeren, 2009; DeYoung, 2010c). Wiener (1961),
the founder of cybernetics, noted that the entropy of a cybernetic
system reflects the uncertainty of its capacity to move toward its
goals at any given time.
As a cybernetic system, the human brain must encode infor-
mation about (1) desired end states or goals, (2) the current state,
largely comprising evaluations and representations of the world
as it is relevant to those goals, and (3) a set of operators poten-
tially capable of transforming the current state into the goal state;
operators are skills, strategies, and plans that aid one in moving
toward one’s goals (Newell and Simon, 1972; DeYoung, 2010c).
(All of these may be encoded both consciously and unconsciously.
In psychology, the term “goal” is sometimes reserved for explicit,
conscious, specific formulations of goals, but the term is used here
in the broader, cybernetic sense.) The amount of uncertainty in
these three cybernetic elements of a person constitutes psycho-
logical entropy, which reflects the number of plausible options or
affordances available to the individual for representation (both
perceptual and abstract) and for behavior, at any given time
(Hirsh et al., 2012). In other words, the harder it is for the brain to
answer the questions, “What is happening?” and “What should I
do?” the higher the level of psychological entropy. Again, the brain
addresses these questions both consciously and unconsciously;
thus, they need not be explicitly framed in language to be a
constant feature of human psychological functioning.
In explicating EMU,Hirsh et al. (2012) described anxiety as the
innate response to increases in psychological entropy. Entropy is
necessarily aversive to a cybernetic system because it renders the
function of that system (progress toward its goals) more difficult.
In other words, uncertainty is threatening. The crucial exten-
sion of EMU developed in the present theory is that, although
entropy is innately aversive, it is simultaneously innately incen-
tively rewarding. In fact, what is uncertain or unpredicted is
unique as a class of stimuli in being simultaneously threaten-
ing and promising (Peterson, 1999; Peterson and Flanders, 2002).
This unusual, ambivalent property of unpredicted or novel stim-
uli has been well-established in research on reinforcement learn-
ing (Dollard andMiller, 1950; Gray andMcNaughton, 2000), and
can be grasped intuitively by considering instances in which peo-
ple seek out uncertainty for the excitement it provides, despite
attendant risk or even the expectation that loss is more likely than
gain (e.g., gambling).
In cybernetic terms, rewards are any stimuli that indicate
progress toward or attainment of a goal, whereas punishments
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 762 | 2
DeYoung Dopamine and personality
are any stimuli that disrupt progress toward a goal. These def-
initions are generally compatible with the behaviorist defini-
tion of rewards and punishments as stimuli that increase or
decrease, respectively, the frequency of the behaviors leading up
to them. Two classes of reward can be distinguished: consum-
matory rewards, which represent the actual attainment of a goal,
and incentive rewards, also called cues of reward or promises,
which indicate an increase in the probability of achieving a goal.
Similarly, one can distinguish between punishments, which rep-
resent definite inability to reach a goal, and threats, or cues
of punishment, which indicate a decrease in the likelihood of
achieving a goal. (Note that goals can be of any level of abstrac-
tion, ranging from concrete goals like avoiding pain to abstract
goals like succeeding in business, falling in love, or understand-
ing Joyce’s Ulysses.) Importantly, because of the nested nature
of goals, in which superordinate goals are achieved through the
accomplishment of more immediate subgoals, a single stimulus
can be simultaneously a punishment and a threat (of further pun-
ishment) or simultaneously a consummatory reward (attainment
of a subgoal) and an incentive reward (cuing increased likelihood
of attaining the superordinate goal).
The reason that increases in psychological entropy are threat-
ening is relatively obvious, whereas the reason that they are
simultaneously promising is probably not. How could an increase
in entropy simultaneously indicate decreased and increased like-
lihood of meeting one’s goals? The most basic and general answer
is that an unpredicted event signals uncertainty about the likeli-
hood of meeting one’s goals. This likelihood may be increased or
decreased depending on the as-yet-undetermined implications of
the unpredicted event. (Remember, as well, that people have mul-
tiple goals, and an unpredicted event may increase the likelihood
of reaching one goal even as it decreases the likelihood of reach-
ing another.) Another way to say this is that everything both good
and bad comes initially out of the unknown, so that an unpre-
dicted event may signal an obstacle or an opportunity (or it may
simply be neutral, signaling nothing of relevance to any goal), and
which of these possibilities is signaled is often not immediately
evident (Peterson, 1999). What this implies is that the organism
should have two competing innate responses to an unpredicted
event—caution and exploration—and this is exactly what has
been demonstrated (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). (Here it is
important to note that “unpredicted” can refer to any aspect of
an event, such that an event of interest can be unpredicted, even
if it is strongly expected, as long as its timing is not perfectly
predicted). Animals have evolved a suite of behaviors useful in
situations in which they do not know exactly what to do or what
to think—in other words, when prediction fails. Some of these
behaviors are defensive, as what you don’t know can hurt you,
and some are exploratory, as an uncertain situation might always
include some as yet undiscovered reward.
TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE REWARD VALUE OF INFORMATION
Unpredicted events are unified functionally by the fact that they
increase psychological entropy. Nonetheless, they vary widely in
the degree and manner in which they do so, and this variation
helps to determine whether caution or exploration will predom-
inate in response to any given anomaly. For many unpredicted
stimuli, it will be quickly evident that they signal a specific reward
or punishment (or something definitely neutral, which requires
no response beyond learning the irrelevance of the stimulus). In
the case of reward, psychological entropy may be increased rel-
atively little, and the optimal response is often straightforward:
First, in all cases of unpredicted reward, learning should take
place, both so that the behavior that led to the reward is reinforced
and so that environmental cues that may predict the reward are
remembered. This learning constitutes a very basic form of cogni-
tive exploration, transforming the unknown into the known and
the unpredictable into the predictable. Second, if the unpredicted
stimulus is an incentive reward rather than a consummatory
reward, additional approach behavior will often be necessary to
attempt to attain the consummatory reward that is signaled. The
effort expended in this attempt is exploratory (and accompanied
by heightened dopamine release) to the degree that attainment of
the reward remains uncertain following the cue (Schultz, 2007).
The one condition—a fairly common occurrence—that makes
the increased entropy accompanying unexpected incentive reward
more than minimal is when pursuing the reward would disrupt
the pursuit of some other currently operative goal. As discussed in
the next section, one division of the dopaminergic system appears
to potentiate both reinforcement learning and approach behavior
in response to unpredicted reward.
In the case of unpredicted stimuli that signal a specific punish-
ment, determination of what to do is more complicated, primarily
because punishments or negative goals are repulsors rather than
attractors (Carver and Scheier, 1998). Attractors are goals that
require a cybernetic system to minimize distance between current
state and desired state. Repulsors, in contrast, require increasing
the distance of the current state from the undesired state, but
they do not inherently specify a concurrent attractor that could
guide behavior. Thus, psychological entropy is typically increased
more by unexpected punishment than by unexpected reward. As
a general rule, the greater the increase in entropy, the more likely
aversion is to predominate over exploration (Peterson, 1999; Gray
and McNaughton, 2000). Nonetheless, the present theory argues
that all uncertainty has incentive value, and unpredicted threat or
punishment is the crucial test case. What is the incentive reward
value of an unexpected event that clearly signals a specific punish-
ment? Put simply, one potential consummatory reward signaled
by any unpredicted event is information, which is identical to
a decrease of psychological entropy. Exploration is worthwhile,
even in the case of an unexpected punishment, because it may
lead to an increase of information, which will allow the person
to better represent the world or select behavior in future, which
in turn increases the likelihood of goal attainment (and the rele-
vant goal may simply be avoiding the punishment in question).
In other words, any unpredicted event, including unpredicted
threat or punishment, signals the possibility that exploration may
lead to a rewarding decrease in psychological entropy. In the
case of threat, cognitive exploration (searching for relevant pat-
terns in perception and memory) is more likely to be adaptive
than approach-oriented behavioral exploration because a known
punishment should usually be avoided rather than approached.
As discussed below, the other major division of the dopaminer-
gic system appears to potentiate exploration in response to the
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incentive value of the possibility of gaining information—that is,
it drives curiosity or desire for information.
Information potentially relevant for optimal adjustment of
the parameters of a cybernetic system logically has reward value
for that system. Empirical evidence is consistent with this asser-
tion. Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010) cite several studies that have
shown both humans and other species to have a preference for
environments in which rewards, punishments, and even neutral
sensory events can be predicted in advance—in other words, envi-
ronments with greater available information (Badia et al., 1979;
Daly, 1992; Chew and Ho, 1994; Herry et al., 2007). Further,
they have shown that dopaminergic activity tracks this prefer-
ence in monkeys (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009). This
preference is adaptive for any cybernetic system that can uti-
lize information about its environment to predict an effective
course of action in any given situation. The fact that a pref-
erence exists even for neutral events to be predictable is of
interest because it illustrates the fact that information is reward-
ing even if it is not immediately connected to a known reward
or punishment. This is sensible because, in any naturalistically
complex environment, what is neutral or irrelevant at present
may become motivationally relevant in future. Thus, the infor-
mation about the present state maintained by the cybernetic
system is likely to include some potentially extraneous detail,
not inherently linked to a currently operative goal. Another
demonstration of the reward value of information comes from
two studies of curiosity, utilizing trivia questions (Kang et al.,
2009). A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
showed that neural reward signals in the dorsal striatum, upon
seeing the answer to trivia questions, were correlated with the
amount of curiosity about the answer. Thus, desired informa-
tion triggers the brain’s reward system in much the same way
that monetary, social, or food rewards do. A second study showed
that people are willing to expend limited resources to acquire
answers to trivia questions, much as they are to acquire more
concrete rewards.
The third important category of unpredicted stimuli is also
clearly linked to the reward value of information; these are stim-
uli in which what is signaled is itself uncertain. Whether they
are threatening, promising, or neutral is ambiguous, at least ini-
tially. When such stimuli are proximal or otherwise particularly
salient (e.g., a loud, unexpected noise nearby), they trigger an
alerting or orienting response, which involves the involuntary
direction of attention toward the stimulus, so as to aid in iden-
tifying its significance (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). This is
a reflexive form of exploration, aimed at acquiring information
(and potentially capturing fleeting reward). Obviously, unpre-
dicted stimuli of ambiguous value are not a discrete category but
exist on a continuum with the unpredicted stimuli (described
above) that quickly and clearly signal specific rewards or punish-
ments. The more ambiguous the unpredicted stimulus, the more
strongly it should drive both cognitive and behavioral explo-
ration. However, the larger its magnitude as an anomaly—that
is, the more psychological entropy it generates, which is a func-
tion of which goals and representations it disrupts—the more
strongly it will also drive defensive aversion responses, includ-
ing caution, anxiety, fear, or even panic (Peterson, 1999; Gray
and McNaughton, 2000). Severely anomalous events, which have
highly uncertain meaning, constitute one of the most motivat-
ing but also the most conflict-generating, and thus stressful,
classes of stimuli. They trigger massive release of neuromodula-
tors, including both dopamine, to drive exploration, and nora-
drenaline (also called “norepinephrine”), to drive aversion and to
constrain exploration (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009; Hirsh et al.,
2012).
Although dopamine is the focus of the present theory, it will be
necessary to refer occasionally to noradrenaline, which is posited
by EMU as the major neuromodulator of anxiety (Hirsh et al.,
2012). Noradrenaline has been described as a response to “unex-
pected uncertainty” that acts as an “interrupt” or “stop” signal
following increases in psychological entropy (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005). The release of noradrenaline
in response to uncertainty leads to increased arousal and vigilance
and to slowing or interruption of ongoing goal directed activity.
Noradrenaline is released in both phasic and tonic firing patterns.
Short phasic bursts of noradrenaline are necessary for appropri-
ate flexibility within a task, allowing switching between different
strategies and representations when the need arises (Robbins
and Roberts, 2007). Tonic elevations in noradrenaline, however,
appear to indicate a more persistent increase in psychological
entropy and increase the likelihood that performance in a task will
be slowed or interrupted, often with concurrent anxiety (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005; Hirsh et al., 2012). Whereas dopamine is
posited to signal the incentive value of uncertainty, noradrenaline
signals the aversive value of uncertainty (which, in a cybernetic
framework, is equivalent to the degree that uncertainty should
disrupt ongoing goal-directed action). Thus, the present theory
holds that dopamine and noradrenaline act in competition in
response to uncertainty, setting the balance between exploration
and aversion.
FUNCTIONAL NEUROANATOMY OF THE DOPAMINERGIC SYSTEM
The dopaminergic system appears to be largely organized around
two classes of incentive motivation: the incentive reward value
of the possibility of specific goal attainment, and the incentive
reward value of the possibility of gains in information. The theory
developed here is based heavily on a model of the dopaminergic
system proposed by Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010), who reviewed
and synthesized a great deal of what is known about dopamine
into a coherent model positing two distinct types of dopaminer-
gic neuron, which respond to three different types of input. The
two types of dopaminergic neuron they label value coding and
salience coding. Value coding neurons are activated by unpredicted
reward and inhibited by unpredicted aversive stimuli (including
omission of expected reward). The magnitude of their activation
reflects the degree to which the value of the stimulus over- or
under-shoots expectations. They thus provide a signal of the value
of unpredicted stimuli. Salience coding neurons are activated by
unpredicted punishments as well as unpredicted rewards and thus
provide an index of the salience, or degree of motivational sig-
nificance, of stimuli. In addition to value and salience signals, a
third type of input, consisting of alerting signals, excites both value
coding and salience coding neurons (there do not appear to be
any distinct “alerting neurons”). Alerting signals are responses to
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any “unexpected sensory cue that captures attention based on a
rapid assessment of its potential importance” (Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010, p 821) and correspond to the third category of unpre-
dicted stimuli discussed above, in which the value of a stimulus is
initially unclear.
Where the present theory extends the theory of Bromberg-
Martin et al. (2010) is in positing that both value coding and
salience coding dopaminergic neurons are driven by unpredicted
incentives specifically, and that all dopamine release potenti-
ates exploration designed to attain the rewards signaled by
those incentives. The hypothesis that the dopaminergic system
responds to unpredicted incentive rewards is not new (e.g.,
Schultz et al., 1997; Depue and Collins, 1999); however, previ-
ous theories of incentive reward applied only to value coding
dopaminergic neurons. According to the present theory, salience
coding neurons respond to incentive cues for the value of infor-
mation that can potentially be obtained following any increase
in psychological entropy, regardless of whether this increase
stems from an unexpected reward, an unexpected punishment,
or a stimulus of unknown value. The recognition that infor-
mation itself has incentive value for a cybernetic system allows
the integration of both divisions of the dopaminergic system
into a unified theoretical framework, in which the overarching
function of the whole dopaminergic system can be identified
as the potentiation of exploration. Despite this abstract func-
tional commonality, however, the differences between the value
and salience coding divisions of the dopaminergic system are
extensive and crucial for understanding dopaminergic function
and its role in personality. Thus, I next summarize the func-
tional neuroanatomy of the two divisions of the dopaminer-
gic system, as described primarily by Bromberg-Martin et al.
(2010).
Dopaminergic neurons are primarily concentrated in two
adjacent regions of the midbrain, the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) and the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). (In the pri-
mate brain, dopaminergic neurons have recently been discovered
that project to the thalamus from several regions other than VTA
and SNc, but much less is known about these; Sánchez-González
et al., 2005.) The distribution of value coding and salience coding
neurons forms a gradient between VTA and SNc, with more value
coding neurons in the VTA and more salience coding neurons
in the SNc. Nonetheless, populations of both types of neurons
are present in both areas. From the VTA and SNc, dopaminergic
neurons send axons to release dopamine in many brain regions,
including the basal ganglia, frontal cortex, extended amygdala,
hippocampus, and hypothalamus. Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010)
present evidence that value coding neurons project preferentially
to the shell of the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), whereas salience coding neurons
project preferentially to the core of the NAcc and the dorsolateral
PFC (DLPFC). Both value and salience coding neurons project to
the dorsal striatum (caudate and putamen). For other brain struc-
tures, it is currently unclear whether they are innervated by value
or salience coding neurons. Dopamine release in the amygdala
increases during stress (the presence of aversive stimuli), which is
likely to indicate activity of the salience system specifically (Pezze
and Feldon, 2004). The anatomical distribution of projections
from value vs. salience neurons renders each type of neuron
appropriate to produce different types of response to uncertainty,
which can be described as different forms of exploration. This
is particularly evident in relation to the neuroanatomical struc-
tures currently known to be uniquely innervated by each type of
dopaminergic neuron.
Value coding neurons are described by Bromberg-Martin et al.
(2010) as supporting brain systems for approaching goals, evalu-
ating outcomes, and learning the value of actions. These processes
are involved in exploration for specific rewards. The VMPFC
is crucial for keeping track of the value of complex stimuli,
and the shell of the NAcc is crucial to engagement of approach
behavior and reinforcement of rewarded action. Additionally, in
the dorsal striatum, a detailed model exists describing how the
value system signals values both better and worse than predicted.
Dopaminergic neurons have two primary modes of firing: a tonic
mode, in which, as their default, they fire at a relatively con-
stant, low rate, and a phasic mode, in which they fire in bursts
at a much higher rate in response to specific stimuli. Value cod-
ing dopaminergic neurons have also been demonstrated to show
phasic reductions in firing, below the tonic baseline, in response
to outcomes that are worse than predicted (as in omission of
expected reward), which enables them to code negative as well
as positive values. Whereas phasic responses in the value system
signal the value of unpredicted stimuli, shifts in tonic level have
been hypothesized to track the long-run possibilities for reward in
a given situation and to govern the vigor or energy with which an
individual acts (Niv et al., 2007); in the present theory, the tonic
level would correspond to the general strength of the exploratory
tendency, in contrast to the exploratory responses to specific
stimuli produced by phasic bursts of dopamine. Phasic increases
and decreases in firing by the value system interact with two
different dopamine receptor subtypes in the dorsal striatum to
transform the value signal into either facilitation or suppression
of exploratory approach behavior, depending on the presence of
unpredicted rewards or punishments (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010; Frank and Fossella, 2011).
Salience coding neurons are described by Bromberg-Martin
et al. (2010) as supporting brain systems for orienting of attention
toward motivationally significant stimuli, cognitive processing,
and increasing general motivation for any relevant behavior,
processes that are involved in exploration for information. The
DLPFC is crucial for working memory, which involves the main-
tenance and manipulation of information in conscious atten-
tion and is thus central to most complex cognitive operations.
Adequate dopamine in DLPFC is crucial for maintaining repre-
sentations in working memory (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009). The
core of the NAcc is important for overcoming the cost of effort,
for enhancement of general motivation, and for some forms of
cognitive flexibility (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). The theory
presented here hinges on the premise that, whereas the value sys-
tem is designed to potentiate behavioral exploration for specific
rewards, the salience system is designed to potentiate cognitive
exploration for information.
In considering individual differences in personality related
to the dopaminergic system, I argue that the most important
distinction is between value and salience coding dopaminergic
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neurons. Of course, the dopaminergic system contains many fur-
ther complexities that are likely to have important consequences
for individual differences in behavior, motivation, emotion, and
cognition. These include the difference between tonic and pha-
sic firing patterns, different receptor types, and differences in
mechanisms of reuptake and synaptic clearance in different brain
regions, among many others. Regarding how these differences
influence specific traits, however, too little evidence exists to be
of much use. At the level of resolution with which personality
neuroscience has been studied to date, the difference between the
value and salience coding systems appears to be sufficient to cre-
ate a relatively unified account of how dopamine is involved in
personality. Hopefully, future research will flesh out the frame-
work presented here with a more detailed model of how more
fine-grained differences within each of the two major divisions of
the dopaminergic system influence personality.
EXPLORATION: MOTIVATION AND EMOTION ASSOCIATED WITH
DOPAMINE
With a basic understanding of dopaminergic neuroanatomy, we
can now turn to the question of how dopaminergic function is
manifest in human behavior and experience. To say that it is man-
ifest in exploration is likely to be misleading without a thorough
understanding of the pervasive influence of the exploratory ten-
dency. Some might argue that my use of “exploration” to describe
all cognition and behavior in response to the incentive reward
value of uncertainty is problematically broad, but this breadth is
crucial to the theory. The assertion that all dopaminergic func-
tion is in service of exploration hinges on the observation that
dopamine is not released in response to all motivationally relevant
stimuli (e.g., all cues of reward), but only to those that are unpre-
dicted or uncertain. Thus, dopamine is not simply an energizer of
all behavior. Indeed, Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999, p 24) argued
that “the effects of [dopamine] agonists may be better charac-
terized as elevations in general exploration rather than general
motor activity.”
Following Peterson (1999), I argue that all psychological func-
tion is either engaged with the unknown (adapting to increases
in psychological entropy through exploration), or it is concerned
with stabilizing ongoing goal pursuit (engaging in activities aimed
at preventing increases in psychological entropy)3. This observa-
tion highlights the continual necessity of exploration, as uncer-
tainty arises frequently across a wide range of magnitudes of
implication for representation and behavior. For minor uncer-
tainties, processes of exploration are unlikely to be conscious or
explicitly noted using the colloquial vocabulary of “exploration,”
but they are nonetheless importantly exploratory in their func-
tion. For example, many processes of learning can be considered
exploration. (To equate all processes of learning with exploratory
3The neuromodulators dopamine, noradrenaline, and acetylcholine all
appear to govern elements of adaptation to increases in psychological entropy
(Yu and Dayan, 2005; Hirsh et al., 2012), whereas serotonin appears to govern
the stabilization of goal-directed behavior that allows avoidance of increased
entropy; the latter is accomplished by serotonin’s suppression of disruptive
impulses and facilitation of goal-congruent behavior (Gray andMcNaughton,
2000, Appendix 10; Carver et al., 2008; DeYoung, 2010a,b; Spoont, 1992).
processes potentiated by dopamine would be too broad, however.
Learning from punishment, for example, often involves contrac-
tion of the cybernetic system, abandoning a particular goal or
subgoal and avoiding it in future. This kind of learning as pruning
of the goal system is specifically punishment-related and probably
facilitated by noradrenaline rather than dopamine.) Any kind of
expansive rather than contractive learning, in which new associa-
tions are being formed, is exploratory and probably facilitated by
dopamine (Knecht et al., 2004; Robbins and Roberts, 2007).
Another case in which somemight consider my use of the term
“exploration” too broad comes in contexts where exploration
has been contrasted with exploitation (Cohen et al., 2007; Frank
et al., 2009). These are situations in which the individual must
choose between continuing to pursue a strategy with a reward
value that is at least partly predictable (exploitation), or switch-
ing to some other strategy with an unknown reward value that
may be greater (but may be less) than that of the current strategy
(exploration). This is an important distinction, but I would argue
that, even in exploitation mode, some forms of dopaminergically
mediated exploration take place, unless the reward in question
and its associated cues are entirely predictable, in which case no
dopaminergic activity will be evoked. This exploration includes
not only learning about the reward and its cues but also any effort
exerted to ensure the delivery of the reward, as long as that deliv-
ery is at all uncertain. One crucial fact about the dopaminergic
system is that its tonic activity increases following a cue of reward,
in proportion to the degree that delivery of that reward remains
uncertain, and this increase is distinct from the phasic bursts that
accompany unpredicted reward or cues of reward (Schultz, 2007).
This tonic elevation seems likely to occur to potentiate effort that
could increase the likelihood of acquiring uncertain rewards, and,
given the premise the dopamine always potentiates exploration, it
supports the existence of exploratory processes during most cases
of “exploitation.” Finally, although the switch from exploitation
mode to exploration mode may be accomplished by noradren-
ergic interruption of goal directed activity (Cohen et al., 2007),
once the individual is in exploration mode, dopaminergic activ-
ity in both value and salience systems should increase to facilitate
exploratory behavior (Frank et al., 2009).
What are the motivational states that accompany exploration?
Activity in the value coding system should be accompanied by
motivation (conscious or unconscious) to learn how stimuli and
actions predict reward and to exert vigorous effort to reach goals.
Activity in the salience coding system should be accompanied by
motivation to learn what predicts reward or punishment and to
engage cognitive effort to understand the correlational and causal
structure of relevant stimuli. When both systems are activated
together by an alerting stimulus, they should produce strong
motivation to learn what just happened and to exert cognitive and
motor effort to classify the unpredicted event.
Note that in the case of unexpected reward, both value and
salience coding dopaminergic neurons will typically be acti-
vated. This is sensible because of the potential benefit from
exploring both the possibility of acquiring the specific reward
in question (signaled by value neurons) and the possibility of
gaining information about the reward and its context (signaled
by salience neurons). In the case of unexpected punishment,
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however, salience neurons will be activated, whereas value neu-
rons will be suppressed. This should facilitate general motivation
to cope with the threat and cognitive and perceptual exploration
of the situation, while suppressing behavioral exploration that
might be risky. The general motivation produced by the salience
systemmay, in the presence of aversive stimuli, aid in overcoming
the cost of effort to explore possible coping strategies for deal-
ing with the threat. Overcoming the cost of effort appears to be
an important function of dopamine, probably attributable to the
value system as well as the salience system. This was demonstrated
by a recent study showing that individual differences in dopamin-
ergic function in the striatum and VMPFC predicted willingness
to expend effort to seek reward, particularly when probability of
receiving the reward was low (Treadway et al., 2012).
Dopamine produces motivation to exert effort to seek reward
or information, but this does not entirely clarify what emotions
accompany dopamine release. Because of its role in response
to reward, dopamine has often been erroneously described as
a “feel-good” chemical. There is no doubt that dopamine can
make people feel good; drugs that increase dopaminergic func-
tion, like cocaine or amphetamine, are abused in part because
they produce feelings of excitement, elation, and euphoria. In
neuroimaging studies, degree of self-reported elation in response
to cocaine was associated with dopaminergic response and lev-
els of neural activity in the striatum (Breiter et al., 1997; Volkow
et al., 1997). Increasingly, however, research shows that positive
hedonic tone, the pleasure or liking felt for reward, is not directly
due to dopamine, but rather to other neurotransmitters, includ-
ing endogenous opiates, and a critical distinction has been made
between the wanting that is produced by dopaminergic activity
and the liking produced by the opioid system (Berridge, 2007).
This distinction has been demonstrated extensively through phar-
macological manipulation in rodents, but relevant human studies
exist as well. For example, administering an opiate antagonist
together with amphetamine eliminated the pleasure otherwise
associated with amphetamine (Jayaram-Lindström et al., 2004).
Dopamine most purely seems to produce desire to seek reward
(i.e., to achieve some goal) or to discover information. This desire
is not necessarily pleasant. When working hard for a reward that
is highly uncertain, for example, or when progress is frustrat-
ingly slow, the desire that is driven by dopamine may involve little
pleasure in and of itself, and may even be experienced as unpleas-
ant. This is true as well of the desire for information associated
with the salience system. People sometimes describe themselves
as “dying of curiosity” or “dying” to reach a particular goal—
it is safe to assume that the use of “dying” as a metaphor rarely
signals straightforward enjoyment. To be extremely eager can be
emotionally painful. Of course, the desire for specific rewards
or information can be accompanied by intense pleasure when
progress toward the goal is satisfactory (cf. Carver and Scheier,
1998), but that particular type of pleasure is likely to be due to the
combination of dopamine release by the value coding system with
release of endogenous opiates.
The role of the opioid system in pleasure does not mean that
high-arousal pleasure states like elation and excitement should
not be considered dopaminergic emotions, because they are prob-
ably never experienced due to opioid activity alone but rather
require dopaminergic activity as well. (Opiate related pleasure
without dopaminergic activity is likely to be experienced as a
more relaxed pleasure, involving satisfaction or bliss, rather than
elation and excitement.) However, the importance of the opi-
oid system for pleasure does highlight the fact that dopaminergic
emotions are not simply pleasant and that they reflect wanting
more specifically than liking. They are likely to include a variety of
emotions oriented toward future acquisition of reward or infor-
mation: desire, determination, eagerness, interest, excitement,
hope, curiosity (cf. Silvia, 2008). (This list is not intended to be
exhaustive.) At present, we can only speculate about the difference
between emotions associated specifically with the value system vs.
the salience system. Emotions related to specific rewards, like ela-
tion or craving, seem likely to be driven primarily by the value
system, whereas curiosity seems likely to be driven primarily by
the salience system. Surprise seems likely to be an emotion tied to
the alerting signal (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). The full range
of emotions related to dopamine should be a fruitful topic for
future research.
Involuntary versus voluntary encounter with the unknown
Up to this point, increases in psychological entropy have been
described primarily as the result of stimuli to which individuals
are involuntarily exposed. This framing glosses over one of the
most important facts about exploration, namely that it frequently
entails voluntary efforts to increase psychological entropy, to put
oneself in situations where one is uncertain of what to do or how
to understand what is happening. This is a relatively straightfor-
ward consequence of the fact that uncertainty has innate incen-
tive reward value, but its implications must not be overlooked.
People seek incentive rewards just as they seek consummatory
rewards; thus, people are motivated to seek increases in psycho-
logical entropy. Individual differences in dopaminergic function
influence not only what people do when confronted with the
unknown but also the degree to which they will eagerly seek out
the unknown. Individual differences in exploration are evident
in everything from mountain climbing to reading. Why there is
some value in exploring in the presence of anomaly is obvious.
What is more complicated is why there is value in unprompted
exploration, the creation of additional psychological entropy even
when no threat to any particular goal is evident.
A mechanism that supplies psychological entropy with reward
value not only serves to encourage learning when anomaly is
encountered, it also drives the organism to look for anomaly even
when this is not necessary. From an evolutionary perspective,
unnecessary exploration may be advantageous, despite attendant
risk, because it tends to increase potentially useful knowledge
about the environment, which may sooner or later facilitate either
acquisition of reward or avoidance of punishment. EMU posits
the evolutionary function of voluntary exploration to be a long-
term decrease in entropy—that is, a more effective strategy for
pursuing the goals of the organism (Hirsh et al., 2012), and my
extension of EMU does not alter that assumption. However, evo-
lution does not need to instantiate a particular goal directly, as
long as the goals it does instantiate serve that function; for exam-
ple, evolution does not need to instill a desire for offspring as
long as it instills a desire for sex. Because of the innate incentive
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value of uncertainty, people desire exploration for its own sake
(i.e., they treat it as a goal in itself) and engage in it even at
times when exploration will not obviously further their goals.
The exploration theory of dopamine posits that, although human
beings are indeed “motivated to reduce the experience of uncer-
tainty to a manageable level” (Hirsh et al., 2012, p 4), they are also
motivated to increase the experience of uncertainty to an inter-
esting level—in other words, to a level at which some previously
unknown reward or information may be discovered. Thus, explo-
ration is used not only to transform the unknown into the known,
but also the known into the unknown (Peterson, 1999). The value
system seems likely to drive unprompted, but potentially fruitful,
behavioral exploration of the social and physical world, whereas
the salience system seems likely to drive spontaneous innovation
and cognitive exploration.
DOPAMINE AND PERSONALITY
With a working model of the role of dopamine in the human
cybernetic system, we can now turn to personality. How do indi-
vidual differences in the functioning of the dopaminergic system
relate to individual differences in personality traits? Personality
traits are probabilistic descriptions of the frequency and intensity
with which individuals exhibit particular behavioral, motiva-
tional, emotional, and cognitive states (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson and
Gallagher, 2009; DeYoung, 2010b; Corr et al., 2013). The major
goal of personality neuroscience is to identify the mechanisms
that produce those states and the parameters of thosemechanisms
that vary to influence personality traits (DeYoung, 2010b). In the
previous sections, I have elaborated on the exploratory states that
are associated with dopaminergic function. In what follows, I
develop a theory of the traits related to those states.
Three broad dopaminergic parameters seem likely to be cen-
trally important for determining personality traits: (1) global
levels of dopamine, determined by genetic and metabolic pro-
cesses that influence availability of dopamine throughout the
dopaminergic system, (2) level of activity in the value coding
dopaminergic system, and (3) level of activity in the salience cod-
ing dopaminergic system. Obviously, some individual differences
in behavior and experience are likely to be associated with addi-
tional parameters more fine-grained than these three, such as
the density of different dopaminergic receptors in different brain
structures, or the efficiency of different mechanisms of synaptic
dopamine clearance. Nonetheless, the extent of available evidence
is not yet conducive to compelling theory at that level of detail,
and I will only occasionally speculate about such effects, when it
is particularly relevant to the evidence in question.
An important premise in many theories of the biological
basis of personality is that traits reflect relatively stable responses
to broad classes of stimuli (Gray, 1982; Corr et al., 2013).
(Note that this should alleviate any concern that personal-
ity trait constructs are inadequate to describe human behavior
because they are not context sensitive. They are indeed con-
text sensitive, but the broader the class of stimuli in question,
the more contexts to which they will be relevant.) With this
in mind, we can identify uncertain or unpredicted stimuli as
the very broad class to which all traits influenced by dopamine
are responses. Other traits (e.g., Neuroticism) may also reflect
stable patterns of response to uncertainty, but they reflect dif-
ferent types of response (aversive or defensive responses in the
case of Neuroticism). Dopaminergic traits reflect individual dif-
ferences in incentive responses to uncertainty. Global level of
dopamine should influence typical exploratory responses to the
incentive value of all kinds of uncertainty. Activity level in the
value system should influence typical exploratory responses to
cues of specific reward, and activity level in the salience sys-
tem should influence typical exploratory responses to cues of
information.
PERSONALITY STRUCTURE: DOPAMINE IN THE BIG FIVE HIERARCHY
The core of the present theory is that activity level in the value
system is reflected in Extraversion, activity level in the salience
system is reflected in Openness/Intellect, and global levels of
dopamine are reflected in the metatrait Plasticity, which repre-
sents the shared variance of Extraversion and Openness/Intellect
(DeYoung, 2006). All other traits influenced by dopamine are
hypothesized to be related to these three traits or one of their
subtraits (although not every trait related to these three traits is
presumed to be influenced by dopamine). To understand why
these are the primary traits of interest requires some discussion
of personality structure. The goal of the present theory is to link a
theory of dopamine to what is already known about the structure
of personality in general. One might instead ignore the history of
research on personality structure and posit a trait of exploration,
or interest, or curiosity, or engagement, and then develop a ques-
tionnaire scale specifically targeting that trait (e.g., Kashdan et al.,
2004). Indeed, if the present theory is correct, such a scale would
be likely to correspond well to the trait manifestation of dopamin-
ergic function in personality, but, additionally, it should be very
strongly related to Plasticity, due to the comprehensiveness of the
Big Five as a taxonomy.
Extraversion and Openness/Intellect are two of the Big
Five personality traits, which also include Conscientiousness,
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (John et al., 2008). The Big Five
system (also known as the Five-Factor Model) was developed
empirically, through factor analysis of patterns of covariance
among ratings of personality using trait-descriptive adjectives
taken from the lexicon (Goldberg, 1990). Very similar five-factor
solutions have been found in many languages4. Importantly, the
Big Five appear not only in lexical research, but also in factor
analysis of many existing personality questionnaires, even when
those questionnaires were not designed to measure the Big Five
(Markon et al., 2005). Additionally, factors closely resembling the
Big Five appear in factor analysis of symptoms of personality
disorder (Krueger et al., 2012; De Fruyt et al., 2013).
The major premise of the Big Five as a taxonomy is that
the same five latent factors are present in any sufficiently com-
prehensive collection of personality assessments. This means
4A six-factor solution may be somewhat more replicable across languages
(Ashton et al., 2004), but this system is not very different from the Big Five
because the major change is simply to split Agreeableness into two factors
(DeYoung et al., 2007; McCrae et al., 2008; De Raad et al., 2010). At any
rate, the primary traits of interest for the present theory, Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect, remain essentially the same in the six-factor solution.
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that five major dimensions underlie most variation in human
personality, and personality neuroscience should focus on
explaining the mechanisms and parameters that are responsible
for the coherence of these dimensions. Extraversion, for exam-
ple, represents the shared variance of diverse traits including
gregariousness, assertiveness, positive emotionality, and excite-
ment seeking. Personality neuroscience needs to explain what
these traits have in common in their underlying neurobiological
processes. Given that the brain controls all behavior, person-
ality traits must proximally be produced by variation in brain
function, regardless of their distal sources in genetic and envi-
ronmental influences (DeYoung, 2010b). Because the brain is a
single unified cybernetic system, biological theories for all specific
traits should be compatible and ultimately unified. Thus, theories
of specific, theoretically-derived personality traits (e.g., explo-
ration or curiosity) should not stand alone, but should rather be
integrated with theories based on the Big Five.
The other crucial fact about personality structure for
the present theory is that traits are organized hierarchically
(Figure 1). Traits near the top of the personality hierarchy repre-
sent broad regularities in psychological functioning, encompass-
ing many different types of behavior and experience that tend to
vary together. Narrower traits lower down in the hierarchy rep-
resent more limited sets of behavior and experience that tend
to vary together. Important traits exist both above and below
the Big Five in the personality hierarchy (Markon et al., 2005;
DeYoung, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2007). Although the Big Five were
originally assumed to be orthogonal and the highest level of the
personality hierarchy, they have been demonstrated to have a reg-
ular pattern of intercorrelation that reveals the existence of two
higher-order personality factors (Digman, 1997; DeYoung, 2006;
Chang et al., 2012), and these higher-order factors or metatraits
are also evident in genetic correlations derived from samples of
twins (McCrae et al., 2008). We labeled the metatraits Stability
(the shared variance of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and
reversed Neuroticism) and Plasticity and hypothesized that they
reflect the primarymanifestations in personality of individual dif-
ferences in serotonergic and dopaminergic function, respectively
(DeYoung et al., 2002; DeYoung and Gray, 2009).
Below the Big Five in the personality trait hierarchy are two
additional levels of structure. The bottom level of the hierarchy
is described as containing facets, many narrow traits that form
the constituent elements of all broader dimensions. No consensus
exists as to the number and identity of the facets, and differ-
ent instruments assess different collections of facets. Recently, a
level of personality structure has been discovered between the
many facets and the Big Five domains, appearing first in behav-
ioral genetic research in twins, which found that two genetic
factors were necessary to explain the covariance among the six
facets in each Big Five domain as measured by the popular NEO
Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO PI-R; Costa and McCrae,
1992b; Jang et al., 2002). If the Big Five were the next level of
the personality hierarchy above the facets, only one genetic factor
would be necessary for each domain. This finding was extended
by a non-genetic factor analysis of 15 facet scales within each Big
Five domain that found evidence for the existence of exactly two
factors in each of the Big Five (DeYoung et al., 2007). These fac-
tors corresponded sufficiently closely to the previously reported
genetic factors to suggest that both studiesmight be describing the
same intermediate level of structure within the Big Five hierarchy.
Traits at this level were described as aspects, with each of the Big
Five having two aspects, and the aspect factors were characterized
by correlating them with over 2000 items from the International
Personality Item Pool. This procedure enabled the construction of
an instrument to measure the aspects, the Big Five Aspect Scales
(BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007).
The aspect level of personality structure is important in part
because it is empirically derived, whereas most lists of facets have
been rationally derived. The 10 aspects of the Big Five provide a
less arbitrary system than the facets for investigating personality
traits below the Big Five, and they seem likely to represent the
most important differentiations for discriminant validity within
each of the Big Five (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2013a). As well as dis-
cussing evidence for the relation of dopamine to Extraversion,
Openness/Intellect, and Plasticity, I argue that the aspect-level
of the personality hierarchy is important for understanding the
full extent of dopamine’s influence on personality, as depicted in
Figure 1. Crucially, traits at lower-levels of the hierarchy contain
FIGURE 1 | The Big Five personality trait hierarchy (DeYoung, 2006, 2010b; DeYoung et al., 2007). Traits outlined in bold are hypothesized to be influenced
by dopamine.
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unique genetic variance, not shared with traits at higher levels
(Jang et al., 2002). Thus, dopamine may influence aspect level
traits without influencing the traits above them in the hierarchy.
EXTRAVERSION
The dimension identified as Extraversion in the Big Five rep-
resents the shared variance among traits including talkative-
ness, sociability, leadership, dominance, activity level, positive
emotionality, and excitement seeking. The various facets of
Extraversion group into two related but separable aspects,
Assertiveness and Enthusiasm, with Assertiveness encompass-
ing traits like leadership, dominance, and persuasiveness, and
Enthusiasm encompassing sociability or gregariousness and pos-
itive emotionality. Some traits, like talkativeness, are shared by
both Assertiveness and Enthusiasm. One facet of Extraversion
that does not fit neatly into either major aspect of the trait
is excitement seeking, which will be discussed in the section
Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking with related constructs like sen-
sation seeking and novelty seeking (DeYoung et al., 2007; Quilty
et al., 2013).
Extraversion is the trait most commonly linked to dopamine
in the existing personality literature, and Extraversion is believed
to reflect the primary manifestation in personality of sensitiv-
ity to reward (Depue and Collins, 1999; Lucas and Baird, 2004;
Smillie, 2013). A number of studies have found evidence of a
link between Extraversion and dopamine using pharmacological
manipulation of the dopaminergic system (Depue et al., 1994;
Rammsayer, 1998; Wacker and Stemmler, 2006; Wacker et al.,
2006, 2013; Depue and Fu, 2013). Although Extraversion is often
viewed as a social trait, it encompasses more than just social
behavior, including physical activity level and positive emotion
even in non-social situations. Further, its social component can
be seen as the direct result of the fact that many human rewards
are social; among the most potent human rewards are social sta-
tus or dominance and interpersonal affiliation. Sensitivity to the
reward value of status appears to be associated primarily with
Assertiveness, whereas sensitivity to the reward value of affiliation
appears to be associated primarily with Enthusiasm (DeYoung
et al., 2013a).
In a similar vein, Depue and colleagues (Depue and Collins,
1999; Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005) have distinguished
between Agentic Extraversion and Affiliative Extraversion, which
correspond reasonably well to Assertiveness and Enthusiasm,
respectively. However, they have tended to lump traits related
to Agreeableness together with Affiliative Extraversion, which
can be misleading because Enthusiasm appears to entail find-
ing affiliation rewarding, whereas Agreeableness appears to be
related to affiliation for other reasons (such as the ability
to empathize). Agreeableness reflects differences in the vari-
ous forms of altruistic social behavior. The relations among
Extraversion and Agreeableness can be clarified by noting that
these two traits define the interpersonal circumplex (IPC), a
two-dimensional model widely used to describe social behavior
(DeYoung et al., 2013a). The two aspects of Agreeableness are
Compassion, describing empathy and concern for the feelings and
desires of others, and Politeness, describing suppression of rude
or aggressive behavior. Assertiveness and Compassion correspond
to the vertical and horizontal axes of the IPC, and Enthusiasm
and Politeness correspond to the diagonal axes at 45 and 315◦
(Figure 2). Because Enthusiasm and Compassion are adjacent
axes of the circumplex, they are as strongly correlated with each
other as with the other aspect of their respective Big Five trait,
and this has led some researchers to blur the distinction between
Compassion and Enthusiasm. Such blurring is likely to be prob-
lematic for personality neuroscience, given the hypothesis that
Enthusiasm is related to reward sensitivity but Compassion is not
(DeYoung et al., 2013a).
In previous work, we have hypothesized that Assertiveness
and Enthusiasm reflect wanting and liking respectively, which
would suggest that only Assertiveness should be directly related
to dopaminergic function (DeYoung, 2010b; Corr et al., 2013;
DeYoung et al., 2013a). This would be consistent with the hypoth-
esis of Depue and Collins (1999) that Agentic Extraversion,
specifically, is related to dopamine. This contrast is probably
overly simplistic, however. Based on the emotional content asso-
ciated with Enthusiasm and a study by Smillie et al. (2013),
the current theory proposes that Enthusiasm reflects a combi-
nation of wanting and liking, whereas Assertiveness is a purer
reflection of wanting. The most explicitly emotional items in
the BFAS assessment of Enthusiasm are, “Rarely get caught up
in the excitement,” “Am not a very enthusiastic person,” and
“Showmy feelings when I’m happy” (DeYoung et al., 2007). These
are the sort of eager, vigorous emotional responses that suggest
dopaminergic activation in response to the promise or delivery of
reward. Of course, they are also suggestive of hedonic pleasure
in the receipt or imagination of reward, and the present the-
ory maintains the hypothesis that variance in Enthusiasm reflects
variation in the opioid system but proposes that it is also influ-
enced by the dopaminergic value system. This would be consistent
with the finding that both Assertiveness and Enthusiasm simi-
larly predicted high levels of activated positive affect (e.g., feeling
“energetic” and “active”) in response to an appetitive film clip
depicting vigorous goal-directed behavior (Smillie et al., 2013).
These findings suggest that both Assertiveness and Enthusiasm
predict individual differences in emotional response to the kind of
incentive cues that trigger dopaminergic activity in the value sys-
tem. Nonetheless, because Enthusiasm is assumed to reflect liking
as well as wanting, variance in Assertiveness is hypothesized to be
FIGURE 2 | Angular relations among the aspects of Extraversion and
Agreeableness correspond to the interpersonal circumplex (DeYoung
et al., 2013a). Aggression characterizes the low pole of Politeness. Traits in
bold are hypothesized to be influenced by dopamine.
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more strongly related to dopamine than is variance in Enthusiasm
(cf. Wacker et al., 2012).
No discussion of the relation of Extraversion to dopamine
could be complete without reference to the work of Jeffrey Gray,
who was one of the first researchers to develop a biological
personality model based on the premise that traits represent con-
sistent individual differences in responses to different classes of
stimuli (Gray, 1982). Gray developed a “conceptual nervous sys-
tem” that included a Behavioral Activation or Approach System
(BAS) to respond to cues of reward and a Behavioral Inhibition
System (BIS) and Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS) to respond
to threats (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). Personality traits are
proposed to result from individual difference in the sensitivity of
these systems. The biological basis of the BAS was never fleshed
out as thoroughly as that of the BIS and FFFS, but its core was
always presumed to be the dopaminergic system and its projec-
tions to the striatum (Pickering andGray, 1999). Panksepp (1998)
has posited a similar system centered around dopaminergic func-
tion, which he labeled the SEEKING system.
Gray (1982) originally considered the trait associated with BAS
sensitivity to be different from Extraversion and suggested that it
could be characterized as Impulsivity. More recent research, how-
ever, suggests that measures of BAS sensitivity assess the same
latent trait as measures of Extraversion and that impulsivity is a
distinct trait (Zelenski and Larsen, 1999; Elliot and Thrash, 2002;
Pickering, 2004; Smillie et al., 2006; Wacker et al., 2012). One
of the most popular measures of BAS sensitivity includes three
subscales, Drive, Reward Sensitivity, and Fun Seeking (Carver
and White, 1994). Drive appears to be a reasonably good indi-
cator of Assertiveness, whereas Reward Sensitivity may be more
related to Enthusiasm (Quilty et al., 2013), although one study
found that it loaded with Drive on an Agentic Extraversion fac-
tor (Wacker et al., 2012). Fun Seeking is similar to Excitement
Seeking and will be discussed below in the section Impulsivity and
Sensation Seeking. Total BAS sensitivity scores from this instru-
ment have been shown to predict pharmacological responses to a
dopaminergic drug (Wacker et al., 2013).
If Extraversion is the primary manifestation of reward sen-
sitivity in personality, a major contributor to that sensitivity
seems likely to be the tendency to seek and learn about pos-
sible rewards, which is driven by the value coding dopaminer-
gic system. Most of the behaviors associated with Extraversion
function as forms of exploratory behavior designed to pursue
rewards. (Note that speech is an important mode of behav-
ior in social interactions, often used to pursue rewards related
to status and affiliation.) Extraversion has been shown to pre-
dict better learning under conditions of reward in reinforce-
ment learning paradigms (Pickering, 2004; Smillie, 2013), as
well as to predict facilitation of reaction times and accuracy
following rewarding stimuli (Robinson et al., 2010). A recent
study showed that Extraversion predicted the tendency for
Pavlovian conditioning to take place when subjects were given
a dopamine agonist rather than a placebo (Depue and Fu,
2013).
In addition to the pharmacological studies of dopamine men-
tioned above, neuroimaging studies provide evidence of the link
between Extraversion and the brain systems involved in reward.
Several structural MRI studies have found that Extraversion is
associated with greater volume of VMPFC, a region known to
be innervated by the value coding dopaminergic system and
involved in coding the value of rewards (Omura et al., 2005;
Rauch et al., 2005; DeYoung et al., 2010; but see Kapogiannis
et al., 2012, for a failure to replicate). A few fMRI studies have
shown that brain activity in response to monetary rewards or
pleasant emotional stimuli is associated with Extraversion, but
their samples sizes have typically been very small (N < 20), ren-
dering their findings inconclusive (Canli et al., 2001, 2002; Cohen
et al., 2005;Mobbs et al., 2005). Nonetheless, on the whole, a com-
pelling body of evidence suggests that Extraversion may reflect
the primary manifestation of individual differences in the value
coding dopaminergic system as it interacts with other elements
of the brain’s reward systems. Extraversion has been described
in a cybernetic context as an energizer of behavior (Van Egeren,
2009), precisely the role ascribed to tonic levels of dopamine (Niv
et al., 2007). This description is congruent with the present the-
ory, as long one specifies that it is exploratory behavior specifically
that is energized by dopamine, and that behavior energized by
the value coding system corresponds primarily to Extraversion,
whereas behavior energized by the salience system corresponds
primarily to Openness/Intellect.
OPENNESS/INTELLECT
Openness/Intellect describes the general tendency to be imag-
inative, curious, perceptive, creative, artistic, thoughtful, and
intellectual. The psychological process unifying these traits has
been identified as “cognitive exploration,” with cognition con-
ceived broadly to include both reasoning and perceptual processes
(DeYoung et al., 2012; DeYoung, in press) 5. The trait’s com-
pound label stems from an old debate, with some researchers
favoring “Openness to Experience” and others “Intellect” (e.g.,
Goldberg, 1990; Costa and McCrae, 1992a). In fact, these two
labels capture the two distinct (but equally important) aspects
of the trait, with Intellect reflecting engagement with abstract
information and ideas and Openness reflecting engagement with
perceptual and sensory information (Saucier, 1992; Johnson,
1994; DeYoung et al., 2007). When I refer to “Openness/Intellect,”
I am referring to the Big Five dimension; when I refer to either
“Intellect” or “Openness” alone, I am referring just to one sub-
trait within Openness/Intellect. Traits within Intellect include
intelligence, perceived intelligence or intellectual confidence, and
intellectual engagement, whereas traits within Openness include
artistic and aesthetic interests, absorption in sensory experience,
fantasy proneness, and apophenia or overinclusive pattern detec-
tion (DeYoung et al., 2012; DeYoung, in press). (The inclusion
of intelligence within Intellect is controversial and will be dis-
cussed further below.) The present theory posits that variation
5Note that the reward learning associated with the dopaminergic value sys-
tem, which the present theory associates primarily with Extraversion, can be
considered a basic form of “cognitive exploration.” However, the potentiation
of exploration that would more typically be considered “cognitive,” involving
the search for correlational or causal patterns in perception and memory, is
posited to be the function of the salience system and hence associated with
Openness/Intellect.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 762 | 11
DeYoung Dopamine and personality
in Openness/Intellect reflects, in part, variation in the salience
coding dopaminergic system.
The evidence for involvement of dopamine in
Openness/Intellect is more circumstantial than the evidence
for Extraversion, with the exception of two molecular genetic
studies showing associations with the DRD4 (dopamine D4
receptor) and COMT genes in three samples (Harris et al., 2005;
DeYoung et al., 2011). COMT (catechol-O-methyltransferase) is
an enzyme that degrades dopamine and is important for synaptic
clearance. Because D4 receptors are localized primarily in the
cortex (Meador-Woodruff et al., 1996; Lahti et al., 1998), and
because COMT is believed to be more influential on dopamin-
ergic levels in the cortex than in the striatum (Tunbridge et al.,
2006), these associations seem particularly likely to be related
to cognitive exploration and the salience coding dopaminergic
system. Nonetheless, molecular genetic studies are notoriously
difficult to replicate, and the circumstantial evidence is, therefore,
additionally important.
We originally hypothesized that dopamine is involved in the
biological substrate of Openness/Intellect based on four lines of
evidence (DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005). First, as noted above, the
involvement of dopamine in curiosity and exploratory behav-
ior is well-established. Given the centrality of curiosity to the
Openness/Intellect factor, and its relation to exploratory traits
like novelty seeking and sensation seeking (Costa and McCrae,
1992a; Aluja et al., 2003), the conceptual link to dopamine is
obvious. Second, dopamine is involved in the mechanisms that
support cognitive exploration specifically, being necessary for
working memory function and also contributing to learning.
Openness/Intellect is the only Big Five trait positively associ-
ated with working memory ability, and its Intellect aspect has
been shown to predict neural activity in the PFC that is corre-
lated with working memory performance (DeYoung et al., 2005,
2009). These findings suggest that variations in salience coding
dopaminergic function in PFC might be partly responsible for
the cognitive attributes associated with Openness/Intellect. Third,
Openness/Intellect appears to be associated with reduced latent
inhibition (Peterson and Carson, 2000; Peterson et al., 2002).
Latent inhibition is an automatic pre-conscious process that
blocks stimuli previously categorized as irrelevant from entering
awareness. Dopamine appears to be the primary neuromodulator
of latent inhibition, with increased dopaminergic activity produc-
ing reduced latent inhibition (Kumari et al., 1999). Finally, the
correlation of Openness/Intellect with Extraversion, which reveals
the metatrait Plasticity, is itself suggestive that dopamine may be
one cause of their covariance, given the evidence for dopamine’s
involvement in Extraversion.
Highlighting the fact that the division of the dopaminergic
system into salience and value coding systems is coarse, and
that each system has multiple subcomponents, the salience cod-
ing dopaminergic system seems likely to play somewhat different
roles in Intellect vs. Openness. Intellect rather than Openness is
uniquely associated with general intelligence and working mem-
ory (DeYoung et al., 2009, 2013b; Kaufman et al., 2010) and seems
likely to reflect dopamine’s facilitation both of voluntary reason-
ing processes that rely on DLPFC and of motivation to reason
about experience. Openness, in contrast, appears likely to reflect
dopamine’s facilitation of the detection of patterns in sensory
experience (Wilkinson and Jahanshahi, 2007). One study found a
double dissociation in which Intellect predicted workingmemory,
but Openness predicted implicit learning, the automatic detec-
tion of patterns (Kaufman et al., 2010). Implicit pattern detection
is likely to be modulated by dopamine’s action in the striatum
rather than the prefrontal cortex, and different branches of the
salience system project to these two brain regions. Additionally,
Openness may be particularly influenced by dopaminergic pro-
jections to the thalamus, which are likely to play an important
role in controlling the flow of sensory information to the cor-
tex and basal ganglia (Sánchez-González et al., 2005). Finally,
Openness, like Enthusiasm, seems likely to be influenced by the
opioid system as well as by dopamine, because aesthetic plea-
sure (the enjoyment of sensory patterns) is one of its key features
(DeYoung, in press). On the whole, Intellect seems likely to be
more strongly linked to dopamine than Openness.
Intelligence
The inclusion of intelligence within Intellect is controversial. I
have made the case for it elsewhere (DeYoung, 2011, in press;
DeYoung et al., 2012) and will not reiterate all the arguments
here because, for the present theory, it is irrelevant whether
one considers intelligence to be a facet of Intellect or a separate
but related trait. In either case, the pattern is maintained that
all traits influenced by variation in dopaminergic function are
related to Plasticity and/or its subtraits. Intelligence has tradition-
ally been separated from most personality traits by its method
of assessment, performance tests as opposed to questionnaires.
Intelligence scores are therefore more specifically an index of abil-
ity than are any scores derived from questionnaires. Nonetheless,
integrating intelligence mechanistically with the rest of personal-
ity is important to further the development of a coherent neuro-
biological explanation of individual differences. Because the brain
is a single system of interacting elements, mechanistic theories
for all specific traits should be compatible and ultimately uni-
fied. One of the mechanisms that may link intellectual confidence
and engagement with intellectual ability or intelligence is the
function of the salience system as it facilitates working memory
and explicit learning. Considerable evidence implicates working
memory capacity as one of the major contributors to general
intelligence (Conway et al., 2003; Gray et al., 2003), although
other factors, like processing speed, and the ability to learn associ-
ations voluntarily are likely to contribute as well (Kaufman et al.,
2009). Given the importance of dopamine for working memory,
dopamine’s link to intelligence is highly likely.
Nonetheless, the evidence directly linking dopamine to tests
of intelligence is not extensive. Some of the best evidence comes
from research on cognitive aging, which has been associated with
the variation in the normative decline in dopamine with age. Even
controlling for age, dopaminergic function assessed by positron
emission tomography (PET) has been found to predict intelli-
gence in these studies (Volkow et al., 1998; Erixon-Lindroth et al.,
2005). Different components of the salience systemmay influence
intelligence differently, with binding at D1-type receptors facil-
itating reasoning and binding at D2-type receptors facilitating
cognitive flexibility (Wacker et al., 2012).
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Creativity
Whereas the inclusion of intelligence within the general
Openness/Intellect factor is controversial, the inclusion of cre-
ativity is not. The general tendency toward innovation, orig-
inality, and creativity is common to both aspects of the trait
and is the facet most central to Openness/Intellect as a whole
(Johnson, 1994; DeYoung, in press). Indeed, Johnson (1994) pro-
posed Creativity as an alternative label for the Openness/Intellect
factor. This proposal was based primarily on the relation of var-
ious trait-descriptive adjectives to the Openness/Intellect factor,
but it has been amply demonstrated that Openness/Intellect is
the best Big Five predictor of creativity, whether creativity is
measured through performance tests in the lab or by creative
achievement in real life (McCrae, 1987; Feist, 1998; Carson et al.,
2005; Chamorro-Premuzic and Reichenbacher, 2008). Creativity
is typically defined as the ability to generate products (abstract or
material) that are simultaneously novel and useful or appropriate
(Mumford, 2003; Simonton, 2008).
Creative achievement, like Openness/Intellect, is associated
with reduced latent inhibition, which presumably allows the
creative person to perceive possibilities that others would auto-
matically ignore and suggests the importance of dopamine for
creativity (Carson et al., 2003). More directly, both genetic and
neuroimaging studies have linked dopamine to performance on
creativity tests (Reuter et al., 2006; de Manzano et al., 2010).
Finally, multiple studies have found that creative performance
is predicted by eye-blink rate, which is a marker of dopaminer-
gic activity that also predicts Extraversion (Depue et al., 1994;
Chermahini and Hommel, 2010, 2012).
Positive schizotypy or apophenia
Schizotypy is a personality trait (more precisely, a cluster of traits)
that reflects subclinical levels of symptoms of schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders in the general population, and it is a major
liability factor for those disorders. Dopamine has long been impli-
cated in schizophrenia, and most anti-psychotic medications are
dopamine antagonists. Importantly, excess dopamine seems to be
involved specifically in the psychotic, or positive, symptoms of
schizophrenia, which include magical ideation, perceptual aber-
rations (e.g., hallucination), and overinclusive thinking (Howes
et al., 2009, 2011). All the symptoms of positive schizotypy can
be described as apophenia, the tendency to perceive meaningful
patterns and causal connections where none in fact exist, and
these symptoms are predicted by Openness (DeYoung et al., 2012;
Chmielewski et al., in press). The tendency to detect covariance
patterns, which is associated with Openness as well as apophe-
nia (Kaufman et al., 2010), may lead to over-interpretation of
coincidences and sensory noise as meaningful patterns. Indeed,
apophenia as a trait is positively correlated with identification of
meaningful patterns in noisy or random visual stimuli (Brugger
et al., 1993; Blackmore and Moore, 1994). Apophenia may be
caused, at least in part, by the low levels of latent inhibition that
have been demonstrated repeatedly in psychosis and schizotypy
(Lubow and Gewirtz, 1995; Gray et al., 2002). (Occasional failures
to detect associations of latent inhibition with schizotypy may be
due to the confounding of positive and negative symptoms. The
latter comprise anhedonia—that is, lack of pleasure in sensory
and social experience—and may actually be positively related
to LI (Cohen et al., 2004), which is consistent with the associ-
ation of anhedonia with dopamine, per the section Depression
and Anxiety below.) In neuroimaging studies, schizotypy has pre-
dicted D2 receptor density and dopamine release in response to
amphetamine (Woodward et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012). Excess
dopamine has been described as producing “aberrant salience” in
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Kapur, 2003). The association
of apophenia with Openness suggests that bothmay be influenced
by level of activity in the salience system (DeYoung et al., 2012),
although apophenia seems likely to be more specifically related to
dopamine than is Openness more generally.
Inclusion of positive schizotypy or apophenia as a facet of
Openness is nearly as controversial as inclusion of intelligence
as a facet of Intellect, in part because apophenia is weakly
negatively correlated with intelligence and nearly uncorrelated
with questionnaire measures of Intellect. Nonetheless, we have
shown that both apophenia and intelligence load positively on
the general Openness/Intellect factor, and that when Openness
and Intellect are separated, then apophenia loads strongly with
Openness (DeYoung et al., 2012). The negative association of
apophenia with intelligence suggests it could be caused in part
by an imbalance of dopaminergic function in different branches
of the salience system. If striatal dopamine is highly active in
response to salient events, encouraging the assignment of mean-
ing to correlational patterns, but dopamine levels in DLPFC are
either too high or too low to support working memory and intel-
ligence, this could lead to difficulty differentiating likely from
unlikely patterns (cf. Howes and Kapur, 2009). (Of course, deficits
in intelligence with causes entirely unrelated to dopamine could
also produce apophenia in conjunction with high levels of activ-
ity in the salience coding system.) Apophenia is clearly linked to
Openness and can be well-described as “openness to implausible
patterns” (DeYoung et al., 2012).
In the Personality Inventory for the DSM 5 (PID-5; Krueger
et al., 2012) and in the Personality Psychopathology Five model
(PSY-5; Harkness et al., 1995), positive schizotypy or apophenia
is labeled Psychoticism. The construct measured by the PID-5 and
other scales assessing apophenia should not be confused with the
construct measured by Eysenck’s Psychoticism scale, which most
personality psychologists agree was mislabeled, as it measures
antisocial and impulsive behavior (sometimes called “impulsive
non-conformity”) rather than positive schizotypy (Goldberg and
Rosolack, 1994; Pickering, 2004; Zuckerman, 2005). Some have
considered impulsive non-conformity to be a facet of schizo-
typy, but it is distinct from the positive psychotic symptoms
that are characterized by apophenia. Eysenck’s Psychoticism does
not appear to predict risk for schizophrenia diagnosis (Chapman
et al., 1994; Vollema and van den Bosch, 1995). Studies linking
Eysenck’s Psychoticism to dopamine (e.g., Kumari et al., 1999)
are thus most relevant to the sections Impulsivity and Sensation
Seeking and Aggression below, which discuss impulsivity and
aggression.
PLASTICITY
Plasticity, the shared variance of Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect, in a sense forms the core of the present
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 762 | 13
DeYoung Dopamine and personality
theory. This very broad trait should be influenced by forces that
alter global dopaminergic tone and thus increase or decrease
activity of both the value and salience systems. For now the
only evidence for this hypothesis is the evidence, described
above that dopamine is involved in both Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect. In future, the hypothesis that Plasticity
should predict global levels of dopamine may be tested directly.
The label “Plasticity” has the potential to be confusing because
the term is more often applied to brain function than to personal-
ity. Psychologists are probably most familiar with it in the context
of the phrase “neural plasticity,” which refers to the ability of the
brain to alter many aspects of its neural architecture in response
to experience. Plasticity, as a personality trait, is not intended to
be synonymous with “neural plasticity,” regardless of the degree
to which neural plasticity plays a role in the exploratory processes
associated with Plasticity. Similarly, Stability, as a personality trait,
is not synonymous with “neural stability.” Rather, the terms refer
to the stability and plasticity of the cybernetic elements that con-
stitute the individual psychologically (DeYoung, 2010c). Recall
that the cybernetic system encompasses (1) desired end states or
goals, (2) knowledge and evaluations of the current state, and (3)
operators potentially capable of transforming the current state
into the goal state. As a parameter of this system, the metatrait
Stability is hypothesized to reflect the degree to which the indi-
vidual resists disruption of ongoing goal-directed functioning
by distracting impulses, maintaining stable goal-representations
and relevant evaluations of the present, and selecting appropri-
ate operators 6. Plasticity is hypothesized to reflect the degree to
which the cybernetic system is prone to generating new goals,
new interpretations of the present state, and new strategies to
pursue existing goals (this is a description of exploration in cyber-
netic terms). As personality traits, Stability and Plasticity reflect
between-person variation in the processes that fulfill two basic
needs of any cybernetic system in an environment that is not fully
predictable: first, to be able to maintain the stability of its own
functioning so that goals may be accomplished, and second, to
be able to explore complex, changing, and unpredictable circum-
stances, thereby increasing the adaptive effectiveness of its goal
pursuit.
Stability and Plasticity may seem conceptually opposed, but
it would be more accurate to describe them as in tension. Of
6Based on this description of the psychological meaning of Stability, one
might expect it to be influenced by dopamine, given dopamine’s role in the
maintenance of the stability of goal representations in DLPFC. Dopamine in
DLPFC is certainly important for the neural stability of representations in
working memory (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009). However, no direct or indi-
rect evidence of the sort cited for other traits in the present theory exists to
suggest that dopamine influences the personality trait Stability. Traits from the
Openness/Intellect domain are the only traits in the Big Five hierarchy that are
consistently related to working memory performance (DeYoung et al., 2005,
2009). It may be that representations in working memory (even when they are
well-stabilized by dopamine) are present for too short a time to be relevant to
the kind of motivational stability reflected by the broad Stability trait. Only
information currently in the field of conscious attention is maintained and
manipulated by working memory. Additionally, the distractions suppressed
in Stability are impulses related to reward or punishment and thus not iden-
tical to the cognitive distractions that must be suppressed for good working
memory function.
course, heightened Plasticity may make Stability a challenge, but
without adequate adaptation enabled by Plasticity, the individual
will not long remain stable in an unpredictably changing envi-
ronment. Because of the nested nature of subgoals within goals,
processes associated with Plasticity can generate new subgoals
in the service of a higher-order goal that is being maintained
by processes associated with Stability. Further, without adequate
Stability, the magnitude of psychological entropy is likely to be
great enough that aversion wins out over exploration, leading to
reduced Plasticity. When the Big Five are measured using ratings
from multiple informants, Stability and Plasticity appear to be
uncorrelated (DeYoung, 2006; Chang et al., 2012). The opposite
of “stability” is “instability” not “plasticity,” and the opposite of
“plasticity” is “rigidity” or “inflexibility” rather than “stability.”
A well-functioning cybernetic system must be both stable and
plastic.
In short, the function associated with Plasticity is posited
to be precisely that which dopamine facilitates: to explore and
thus to achieve the rewards inherent in the positive potential
of uncertainty. Several studies have supported predictions based
on this theory. (For an effect to be considered associated with
Plasticity, it should be associated with both Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect with roughly similar magnitude, so that it is
truly their shared variance driving the effect, rather than vari-
ance at the Big Five level.) For example, Plasticity was found to
predict self-reported moral conformity negatively, based on the
premise that those who conform to societal moral expectations
are less likely to be exploratory or to rely on their own adap-
tive capacity (DeYoung et al., 2002). Plasticity was also found to
positively predict Externalizing (a factor indicating the general
tendency toward impulsivity, aggression, antisocial behavior, and
drug use), following the premise that externalizing behavior is
driven in part by motivation to explore behaviors that are socially
unacceptable, and the fact (discussed below) that externalizing
behaviors have been associated with dopamine (DeYoung et al.,
2008). Stability also predicted conformity and Externalizing, in
the opposite direction from Plasticity. In fact, Stability was the
primary correlate of both of these characteristics, and the asso-
ciation with Plasticity was not evident unless one controlled for
Stability7.
It is particularly of interest to identify behaviors that are pri-
marily associated with Plasticity rather than Stability. The general
tendency to explore may not be most purely manifested in behav-
iors that are most strongly associated with common colloquial
meanings of “exploration,” such as pursuing experiences that are
extremely novel to the individual or unusual or novel in society as
a whole. Such particularly dramatic forms of exploration, espe-
cially when not socially sanctioned, may be predicted not only by
Plasticity, but also by low Stability, as implied by the studies of
conformity and externalizing behavior mentioned above.
7The path from Plasticity to Externalizing reported by DeYoung et al. (2008)
was actually slightly greater than the path from Stability. However, this is likely
to be a quirk of this sample and not to generalize, because externalizing behav-
ior has typically been found to be associated considerably more strongly with
Neuroticism, low Agreeableness, and low Conscientiousness than with either
Extraversion or Openness/Intellect.
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What then are the best specific markers of Plasticity in the gen-
eral population? In one large, middle-aged, middle-class sample
(DeYoung, 2010c), the personality items that specifically charac-
terized Plasticity were dominated by content reflecting leadership,
skill, and expressiveness in social situations (e.g., “Have a natu-
ral talent for influencing people,” “Have a colorful and dramatic
way of talking about things”) with some additional items also
clearly reflecting innovation and curiosity (e.g., “Am able to come
up with new and different ideas,” “Look forward to the opportu-
nity to learn and grow”). In the same sample, we examined how
Plasticity and Stability uniquely predicted the self-reported fre-
quency, over the past year, of 400 behaviors (Hirsh et al., 2009).
We found that Plasticity was almost universally a positive predic-
tor of behavioral frequency, consistent with dopamine’s role as a
motivational energizer, and the behaviors it most strongly pre-
dicted were an intriguing collection, which included planning a
party, attending a public lecture, attending a city council meet-
ing, giving a prepared talk or public recital, writing a love letter,
going dancing, and making a new friend, among others. Here we
see the manifestation of a general exploratory tendency among
middle-aged, middle-class Americans. (In contrast, Stability was
almost universally a negative predictor of behavioral frequency,
with the strongest effects on various impulsive or disruptive
behaviors.) In the present theory, all of these behaviors associated
with Plasticity should be among those most facilitated by increas-
ing dopaminergic activity in both the value and salience systems
simultaneously.
It should be noted that other interpretations and labels have
been offered for the factor we label Plasticity. Digman (1997), who
discovered the metatraits, labeled them simply Alpha (Stability)
and Beta (Plasticity) and proposed that the latter reflects a ten-
dency toward personal growth. Olson (2005, p 1692) labeled
the Plasticity factor Engagement and argued that it reflects “the
extent to which individuals actively engage their inner and outer
worlds.” Further, the metatraits of the Big Five resemble the
two-factor solution that has been reported in lexical studies, in
which the trait containing content from both Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect has been labeled Dynamism (Saucier et al.,
2013). All these interpretations seem compatible with each other.
A general tendency toward exploration will lead to active engage-
ment with novel and interesting phenomena and should produce
behavior that others find dynamic and that is likely to lead to
personal growth.
Lack of simple structure and the relation of Plasticity to
Industriousness and achievement striving
In order to understand the full extent of the probable role of
Plasticity and dopamine in personality, it is important to under-
stand one additional thing about the personality trait hierarchy—
namely that it is an over-simplification. If the personality hier-
archy were exactly as schematically depicted in Figure 1, none
of traits located under Stability would be related to any of
the traits located under Plasticity. However, it has long been
known that personality does not have simple structure, in which
each variable loads on one and only one factor (Costa and
McCrae, 1992b; Hofstee et al., 1992). Attempting to fit the model
depicted in Figure 1 to data from the BFAS, using confirmatory
factor analysis, will yield a poor fit because of cross-loadings
at the aspect-level (e.g., Ashton et al., 2009). Many lower-level
traits are related to more than one higher level trait, and this
is true even across the two sides of the hierarchy defined by
the metatraits. I have already alluded to one example in the
section on Extraversion (also depicted in Figure 2): although
Extraversion and Agreeableness are unrelated, their aspects are
systematically related, such that Enthusiasm is positively related to
Compassion, and Assertiveness is negatively related to Politeness.
Examining the pattern of correlation among the 10 aspects of
the Big Five, and their lack of simple structure, suggests two
important points regarding Plasticity. First, the shared variance
of Extraversion and Openness/Intellect (i.e., Plasticity) appears
to be due primarily to the association of Assertiveness and
Intellect. These two traits are correlated with each other at about
r = 0.5, at least as strongly as they are with the other aspect
of the Big Five trait to which each belongs (DeYoung et al.,
2007). Openness is considerably more weakly associated with
the two aspects of Extraversion, and Enthusiasm is considerably
more weakly associated with both aspects of Openness/Intellect.
Second, there are two other aspect-level traits that are strongly
correlated with Assertiveness and Intellect, as well as with each
other; these are the Industriousness aspect of Conscientiousness
and the Withdrawal aspect of Neuroticism. The latter encom-
passes anxiety and depression and predicts the other traits neg-
atively.
This cluster of traits has been detected in slightly different
guises in previous personality research. First, these aspect-level
traits are all related to the lexical Dynamism factor (Saucier
et al., 2013). Second, an attempt to discredit the existence of the
metatraits, using the BFAS, purported to show that the meta-
traits could be rendered unnecessary by allowing aspect traits
to cross-load on other Big Five factors—in other words, by tak-
ing into account their lack of simple structure (Ashton et al.,
2009). Interestingly, however, the pattern of cross-loadings cre-
ated an “Extraversion” factor that had similarly strong loadings
not only for Enthusiasm and Assertiveness, but also for Intellect,
Industriousness, andWithdrawal. Clearly, this is no longer just an
Extraversion factor but rather a broader trait. In essence, a meta-
trait resembling Plasticity was recreated directly from the covari-
ance of the aspect-level scales. Finally, in the Multidimensional
Personality Questionnaire (MPQ), an Achievement scale that
is strongly related to Conscientiousness and Openness/Intellect
in the Big Five is grouped with scales reflecting Extraversion
in a higher-order Agentic Positive Emotionality factor (Markon
et al., 2005; Tellegen and Waller, 2008). In previously unpub-
lished analysis of the BFAS and the MPQ in the Eugene-
Springfield community sample (ESCS; Goldberg, 1999; N =
445), the Achievement scale showed its strongest correlations
with Industriousness (0.30), Assertiveness (0.32), and Intellect
(0.35). (The Achievement Striving scale from the NEO PI-R
shows a similar pattern of correlations with the BFAS in this
sample, r = 0.56, 0.46, and 0.31, respectively—the stronger corre-
lation with Industriousness is not surprising, as this Achievement
Striving scale was engineered as a facet of Conscientiousness).
Confidence, ambition, and agency seem to be at the core of
manifestations of Plasticity, and they are related not only to
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Extraversion (particularly Assertiveness), but also to Intellect and
Industriousness and to a lack of Withdrawal. (The link between
Withdrawal and dopamine is discussed below in the section
Depression and Anxiety) The present theory posits that all of these
traits are influenced by dopamine.
If the shared variance of Assertiveness and Intellect represents
what is most central to Plasticity, one can understand the relation
of Industriousness to Plasticity as reflecting the contribution that
dopaminergic drive, in both value and salience systems, makes to
the motivation for sustained hard work and the accomplishment
of tasks. As noted above, dopamine appears to be crucial for over-
coming the cost of effort when deciding to initiate behavior aimed
at reward, especially as the probability of attaining the reward
declines (Treadway and Zald, 2013). Industriousness is primar-
ily an aspect of Conscientiousness, which reflects the capacity for
top-down effortful control over impulses and distractions and is
probably determined largely by characteristics of the prefrontal
cortex (DeYoung et al., 2010), but Industriousness appears to
have an important secondary contribution from Plasticity. To
the extent that Industriousness reflects the enactment of a drive
to achieve (rather than just dutifully doing what one is told),
dopamine is likely to be an important influence. Achievement
striving specifically is, therefore, posited to be strongly influ-
enced by dopamine. Although at present there is little direct
evidence for this hypothesis, one study found MPQ Achievement
to be associated with dopamine receptor density in the midbrain
and NAcc in a sample diagnosed with ADHD (Volkow et al.,
2010).
IMPULSIVITY AND SENSATION SEEKING
We now turn to traits related to dopamine that are negatively
rather than positively related to Conscientiousness, and which
are all related to Externalizing. Nonetheless, they are all positively
related to Extraversion, and sometimes to Openness/Intellect as
well. The terminology and exact definitions of these traits have
been a source of confusion for decades, suffering from both the
jingle fallacy (different traits called by the same name) and the
jangle fallacy (the same trait called by different names). Perhaps
the most confusion has been created by use of the word “impul-
sivity” to refer to a number of related but importantly distinct
traits. Impulsivity-related constructs have been substantially clar-
ified by the development of the UPPS model (Whiteside and
Lynam, 2001; Smith et al., 2007), which identifies four dis-
tinct types of impulsivity: Urgency, lack of Perseverance, lack of
Premeditation, and Sensation Seeking. Urgency, the tendency to
act impulsively in ways that have negative consequences under
conditions of emotional arousal, currently appears least relevant
to dopamine; its major correlate in the Big Five hierarchy is low
Stability (DeYoung, 2010a). Perseverance is essentially identical
to Industriousness (discussed above), and thus the current theory
would imply that lack of perseverance might stem in part from
low global levels of dopamine (although it is also possible that
a specific profile of dopaminergic responding in the value sys-
tem to cues of immediate reward rather than cues of more distant
reward could be responsible for lack of perseverance). The clear-
est evidence links lack of premeditation and sensation seeking to
dopaminergic function.
Premeditation refers to “the tendency to think and reflect
on the consequences of an act before engaging in that act”
(Whiteside and Lynam, 2001, p 685). It is associated primarily
with Conscientiousness, in the Big Five, but is more peripheral
to that trait than is Industriousness/perseverance and appears to
be associated almost as strongly (negatively) with Extraversion as
with Conscientiousness (DeYoung, 2010a). Lack of premeditation
reflects rapid action without consideration of possible negative
consequences, which is perhaps the most common meaning of
“impulsivity” in psychology. Its link to Extraversion suggests
the degree to which Extraversion energizes behavior, presum-
ably through dopaminergic mechanisms (Niv et al., 2007; Van
Egeren, 2009). Individuals who tend not to premeditate are
prone to act quickly on their exploratory impulses, rather than
to engage in preliminary cognitive exploration of the possible
consequences of those actions. Thus, lack of premeditation may
reflect reduced activity in the dopaminergic salience system, at
the same time that it reflects increased activity in the value
system.
A negative association of salience system activity with lack of
premeditation is plausible because of the negative association of
intelligence with impulsivity (Kuntsi et al., 2004). Additionally,
variation in theDRD4 gene has been found to moderate the nega-
tive association between intelligence and the general Externalizing
factor, of which impulsivity is a component (DeYoung et al.,
2006). Differential functioning in value and salience systems
might be particularly important in generating symptoms of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which reflects
problematic levels of impulsivity, in the form of both lack of pre-
meditation (impulsivity and hyperactivity symptoms) and lack
of perseverance (inattention symptoms). ADHD is most com-
monly treated by dopamine agonists, such as methylphenidate,
and these appear to have their salutary effects in part by increas-
ing dopamine in DLPFC—that is, in the salience system (Arnsten,
2006).
Sensation seeking reflects “willingness to take risks for the
sake of excitement or novel experiences” (Zuckerman et al.,
1993, p 759). Although it has often been considered a form
of impulsivity and is associated with externalizing behavior
in general (Krueger et al., 2007), a reasonable case can be
made that sensation seeking is not necessarily impulsive. It
may involve planning, perseverance, accurate assessment of
risks, and steps taken to keep risk below a desired level (con-
sider mountain climbing or hang gliding, for example). Indeed,
although sensation seeking predicts frequency of behaviors like
gambling and alcohol and drug use, it does not appear to
predict problematic levels of engagement in those behaviors,
whereas urgency and lack of premeditation do (Smith et al.,
2007).
Although Sensation Seeking, Novelty Seeking, Fun Seeking, and
Excitement Seeking all appear to reflect the same latent trait, some
scales with these labels are broader than others. Zuckerman’s
(1979) Sensation Seeking Scale, for example, contains not only
Thrill-and-Adventure-Seeking and Experience-Seeking subscales,
but also Disinhibition and Boredom Susceptibility subscales,
which have been found to reflect lack of perseverance more
than sensation seeking in the UPPS system (Whiteside and
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Lynam, 2001). Cloninger’s (1987) Novelty Seeking scale is simi-
larly broad, containing subscales labeled Exploratory Excitability,
Extravagance, Impulsiveness, and Disorderliness. The more pure
measures of Sensation Seeking include the version from the UPPS
scales (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001), Excitement Seeking from
the NEO PI-R (Costa and McCrae, 1992b) and Fun Seeking
from the BIS/BAS scales (Carver and White, 1994). Regardless of
their breadth, all of these measures have in common that they
are associated positively with Extraversion and negatively with
Conscientiousness, though the balance is shifted more toward
Extraversion in the purer scales (DeYoung and Gray, 2009; Quilty
et al., 2013). As noted by Depue and Collins (1999), variation in
impulsivity-related traits is likely to be the result not only of vari-
ation in the strength of impulses to approach rewards (related
to Extraversion), but also of variation in the strength of top–
down control systems that constrain those impulses (related to
Conscientiousness).
Using PET to assess the binding potential of dopamine D2
autoreceptors in the SNc and VTA, Zald and colleagues have
produced compelling evidence for the importance of increased
dopaminergic function for lack of premeditation and sensa-
tion seeking. They have shown that both Cloninger’s Novelty
Seeking scale and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (which pri-
marily assesses lack of premeditation; Whiteside and Lynam,
2001) predict reduced D2 binding in the midbrain, which
in turn predicts greater dopaminergic release in the stria-
tum in response to amphetamine (Zald et al., 2008; Buckholtz
et al., 2010b). Because the D2 autoreceptors in the mid-
brain inhibit dopaminergic neurons, reduced binding poten-
tial translates to greater dopaminergic activity. These results
are consistent with previous research associating dopaminergic
function with sensation seeking and impulsivity (Zuckerman,
2005).
Whether the salience system, as well as the value system, is
involved in sensation seeking seems likely to depend on exactly
what type of sensation is being sought. If sensation seeking
involves planning and forethought (e.g., mountain climbing,
hang gliding), then it may be associated with increased activ-
ity in the salience system, whereas more spontaneous sensation
seeking seems less likely to be related to salience. The effect
of dopamine on behavior can either facilitate long-term goal
pursuit or hinder it, depending on other factors that are likely
to include not only the ability of DLPFC to maintain a sta-
ble focus on long-term goals but also differential influence of
different parts of the dopaminergic system (value vs. salience,
striatal vs. cortical, tonic vs. phasic). This observation may
account for the fact that some Extraversion-related traits are pos-
itively related to Conscientiousness, whereas others are negatively
related.
AGGRESSION
Aggression is another trait, like lack of premeditation, that
might be influenced in opposite directions by the value and
salience systems. Salience system deficits are suggested by the
negative association of working memory and intelligence with
aggression (Seguin et al., 1995; Koenen et al., 2006; DeYoung
et al., 2008; DeYoung, 2011). However, more direct evidence
is available for the positive association of the value system
with aggression. Buckholtz et al. (2010a) found that a trait of
Impulsive Antisociality (combining rebelliousness, impulsivity,
aggression, and alienation) was associated with dopaminergic
response to amphetamine, even after controlling for impul-
sivity, novelty seeking, and Extraversion (notably, this was in
the same sample in which they also showed associations of
dopaminergic function with novelty seeking and impulsivity).
These results are reasonably congruent with animal studies link-
ing dopamine to aggression (Seo et al., 2008), and to studies
reporting high levels of dopaminergic metabolites (and low lev-
els of serotonin metabolites) in highly aggressive populations
(Soderstrom et al., 2001, 2003). Like most externalizing behav-
iors other than sensation seeking, aggression is probably more
strongly related to serotonergic than dopaminergic function, but
dopamine nonetheless seems likely to be an important secondary
influence.
Aggression is an excellent indicator of the low pole of
Agreeableness, and specifically of the Politeness aspect of
Agreeableness that is negatively related to Assertiveness, such
that they form adjacent axes of the interpersonal circumplex,
as depicted in Figure 2 (DeYoung et al., 2013b). This link to
Assertiveness suggests that aggression is facilitated by activity in
the value coding dopaminergic system. Assertive people may be
more willing to take aggressive action to pursue rewards. One
important consideration in the possible association of dopamine
with trait levels of aggression is the difference between reactive
and proactive aggression, which have different biological sub-
strates (Lopez-Duran et al., 2009; Corr et al., 2013). Reactive
or defensive aggression is aimed at eliminating a threat, often
appears with panic, and is controlled by low-level defense sys-
tems in the brain that are inhibited by serotonin (Gray and
McNaughton, 2000). Proactive or offensive aggression is aimed
at acquiring resources, dominance status, or revenge and seems
more likely to be influenced by dopamine. (Of course, indi-
vidual acts of aggression may reflect a blend of reactive and
proactive that is difficult to disentangle.) A study comparing rats
bred to be either high or low in threat sensitivity found that
both groups were more aggressive than normal rats, but that
dopaminergic antagonists applied to the NAcc reduced aggres-
sion only in the low threat-sensitivity rats whose aggression seems
likely to be offensive rather than defensive (Beiderbeck et al.,
2012).
DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY
The next traits considered are those that may be negatively related
to dopaminergic function in both value and salience systems.
These fall within the aspect of Neuroticism labeled Withdrawal,
which is one of two traits strongly linked to Plasticity that fall
outside of Extraversion and Openness/Intellect in the Big Five
hierarchy (the other being Industriousness). The grouping of
depression and anxiety in a single trait dimension is consis-
tent with clinical research showing that risks for diagnosis of
depression and generalized anxiety disorder overlap very strongly,
forming a more general factor that has been labeled “Distress”
(Wright et al., 2013). In the Big Five hierarchy, Distress is equiv-
alent to Withdrawal. (Note that, in the PID-5, a slightly different
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factor is labeled Withdrawal, which represents social withdrawal
specifically, rather than anxiety and depression; De Fruyt et al.,
2013.) The connection of the Withdrawal aspect of Neuroticism
with low Plasticity is consistent with lexical research, in which
the Dynamism factor that appears when only two factors are
extracted is related to Withdrawal (Saucier et al., 2013). An
absence of depressed or anxious affect appears to be importantly
related to Plasticity.
Neuroticism is considered to reflect the primary manifesta-
tion in personality of sensitivity to threat and punishment. In
Gray’s system, Neuroticism is the result of the joint sensitiv-
ities of the BIS and the FFFS (Gray and McNaughton, 2000;
Corr et al., 2013). The FFFS produces active avoidance (panic,
defensive anger, and flight) in response to threats where the
only motivation is avoidance. Variation in FFFS sensitivity is not
hypothesized to be related to dopamine. The BIS produces pas-
sive avoidance, inhibiting behavior and increasing vigilance and
arousal when there is conflict between multiple possible goals
or representations—in other words, in response to increases in
psychological entropy. The prototypical activator of the BIS is
an approach-avoidance conflict, in which the possibility of some
reward is juxtaposed with the possibility of punishment (for
example, when the desire to meet a potential mate is in con-
flict with the fear of rejection). The BIS operates by inhibiting
approach toward the goal in question. In other words, it is antag-
onistic to the BAS, suggesting BIS sensitivity may be negatively
associated with activity in the dopaminergic system. The BAS is
inhibited by the BIS in order to produce caution that can prevent
encountering the danger potentially associated with the current
goal (Gray andMcNaughton, 2000). In the Big Five hierarchy, BIS
sensitivity seems to correspond to Withdrawal (DeYoung et al.,
2007; Corr et al., 2013). Gray and McNaughton (2000) subdivide
the passive avoidance states associated with the BIS into anx-
iety and depression, based on whether the danger in question
is perceived to be avoidable or unavoidable. Passive avoidance
in general is a response to dangers that must be approached in
order to achieve some goal. When one is anxious, approach is
slowed, caution and vigilance are increased, and arousal increases
to prepare for a possible switch to flight or panic controlled by
FFFS, if danger becomes too great. Anxiety is a state in which
the possibility of punishment has not entirely overcome the pos-
sibility of reward, such that the goal in question is still potentially
attainable. In contrast, depression is a state in which punishment
is perceived to be unavoidable, which can be described cyber-
netically as a state in which a goal (and therefore reward) is
perceived to be unattainable. Anxiety can be alleviated either by
determining that no real threat is present or by acting in such
a way as to eliminate the threat or at least to reduce the like-
lihood of punishment. Alternatively, anxiety can be alleviated
by abandoning the operative goal and turning to some other
goal (cf. Nash et al., 2011). If the previously operative goal is
not soon replaced by another goal, this abandonment becomes
equivalent to entering a state of depression. Depression is typ-
ically identified when this amotivated state is persistent across
situations and generalizes to multiple goals. When depression
is used to describe a clinical condition, then the abandonment
of goals has been inappropriately generalized. Depression has
been described as “learned helplessness” to reflect the fact that
motivation has been extinguished in the face of threat and the per-
ceived difficulty of achieving goals generally (Miller and Norman,
1979).
Degree of motivation to explore the possibilities for attain-
ing a goal, during or after passive avoidance, may be the core
contribution of individual differences in dopamine to depres-
sion. That dopaminergic function is diminished in depression is
well-established (Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007). The symptom of
depression most often linked to dopamine is anhedonia, loss of
interest or pleasure in one’s usual activities, and this is the fea-
ture of depression that is most clearly negatively associated with
Extraversion (e.g., De Fruyt et al., 2013). Because Extraversion
is the trait that reflects variation in the energetic enjoyment and
pursuit of rewards, anhedoniamay be essentially equivalent to low
Extraversion (or perhaps low Plasticity) in conjunction with high
Neuroticism. Like Extraversion, depression is related to reward
sensitivity, though of course negatively rather than positively
(Pizzagalli et al., 2009; Bress et al., 2012). The loss of interest
associated with anhedonia is particularly likely to be associated
with reduced dopaminergic function (Treadway and Zald, 2013).
Loss of interest might be best described as amotivation, reserving
“anhedonia” to describe loss of pleasure, which seems likely to
be more related to the opioid liking system than to dopamine.
In the present theory, the amotivation associated with depres-
sion reflects a reduction in dopaminergically driven exploration
of possibilities either for reward or for information that might
allow the creation of viable new goals or strategies. Both the value
and salience systems thus seem likely to be influential in depres-
sion. In relation to salience, depression is associated not only with
reduced motivation in general but also with cognitive deficits that
may stem from reduced dopaminergic tone in DLPFC (Murrough
et al., 2011).
Anxiety is probably related to noradrenaline but not dopamine
The association of anxiety with dopaminergic function is more
uncertain than that of depression, and any associations found
between anxiety and dopamine may be due to the high corre-
lation between anxiety and depression. Future research needs
to disentangle these related traits carefully (cf. Weinberg et al.,
2012). Little evidence links dopamine to trait anxiety or anx-
iety disorders specifically. Several candidate gene studies have
reported associations of various dopaminergic genes with anx-
iety or the broader trait of Neuroticism, but, in addition
to the fact that they typically did not control for depres-
sion, they may be false positives, given the lack of confirm-
ing evidence from genome-wide association studies (e.g., de
Moor et al., 2010). Amotivation, which provides the clear-
est evidence for dopamine’s involvement in depression, is not
a central feature of anxiety. The present theory takes the
position that anxiety, as a trait distinct from depression, is
unlikely to be related to individual differences in dopaminergic
function.
As preliminary and indirect evidence for this hypothesis,
Table 1 presents analyses of associations between depression
and anxiety and traits from the Big Five hierarchy depicted in
Figure 1, assessed in 481 members of the ESCS. Anxiety and
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Table 1 | Associations of NEO PI-R Anxiety and Depression (Costa and
McCrae, 1992b) with the Big Five aspect scales (DeYoung et al., 2007)
and Plasticity and Stability scales (DeYoung, 2010c) in the
Eugene-Springfield community sample.
Correlations Partial correlations
Anxiety Depression Anxiety Depression
Plasticity −0.23* −0.35* 0.01 −0.27*
Stability −0.53* −0.68* −0.13* −0.52*
Extraversion −0.24* −0.40* 0.04 −0.33*
Enthusiasm −0.18* −0.33* 0.06 −0.28*
Assertiveness −0.22* −0.35* 0.02 −0.28*
Openness/Intellect −0.05 −0.07 0.00 −0.05
Intellect −0.18* −0.20* −0.06 −0.11*
Openness 0.11* 0.10* 0.06 0.04
Neuroticism 0.70* 0.71* 0.42* 0.46*
Withdrawal 0.73* 0.76* 0.46* 0.52*
Volatility 0.51* 0.51* 0.26* 0.27*
Agreeableness 0.00 −0.10* 0.09 −0.14*
Compassion 0.08 −0.05 0.15* −0.13*
Politeness −0.09 −0.13* 0.00 −0.10*
Conscientiousness −0.09 −0.25* 0.12* −0.26*
Industriousness −0.25* −0.42* 0.04 −0.34*
Orderliness 0.10* −0.01 0.15* −0.10*
N = 481, *p < 0.05
depression were measured using the NEO PI-R, which has no
items identical to those in the questionnaires used to measure the
Big Five and their aspects (BFAS) or the metatraits, which were
assessed using the 40 items previously identified as specific mark-
ers of Stability or Plasticity (DeYoung, 2010c). Although at the
zero order anxiety was correlated with most of the traits hypoth-
esized to be influenced by dopamine, this was due to the variance
anxiety shares with depression. After controlling for depression,
anxiety was not significantly correlated with any of the traits in
question (except of course Withdrawal, of which it is a facet).
Depression, in contrast, remained correlated with those traits
after controlling for anxiety. (The only exceptions for depres-
sion were Openness/Intellect and Openness, which are to be
expected because Openness is positively related to Neuroticism,
despite the fact that Intellect is negatively related; DeYoung et al.,
2012). What this pattern suggests is that, although dopamin-
ergic function may be negatively associated with Withdrawal,
which represents the general tendency toward passive avoid-
ance, only depression is likely to be associated with dopamine
once one examines variance specific to anxiety or depression. If
one considers anxiety without controlling for depression, how-
ever, anxiety may appear negatively associated with dopaminergic
function.
Having staked out the position that trait anxiety is unrelated
to dopamine, except inasmuch as it is related to trait depression,
I now discuss potential evidence against this position, with the
caveat that it comes from rodent research, so generalization to
humans is uncertain. One study showed decreased exploration
and increased postural indicators of anxiety in rats following
depletion of dopamine in medial PFC (Espejo, 1997). A more
recent study in mice provides evidence that the salience system
specifically might be influential in trait anxiety: A manipulated
genetic deactivation of the dopaminergic system in response to
aversive events was found to lead to failure to learn about specific
threats, which in turn led to an overgeneralized threat-sensitivity
analogous to generalized anxiety (Zweifel et al., 2011). Thus, fail-
ure to learn, due to reduced salience system activity, might lead
to anxiety due to increased psychological entropy (i.e., increased
uncertainty).
Nonetheless, it is possible that dopaminergic activity in the
salience system under aversive conditions is orthogonal to anxi-
ety if the latter is considered independently of depression (which
would be difficult to accomplish in rodents). In this case, vari-
ation in the salience system in response to threat would merely
influence the likelihood that someone who responds with anxiety
will engage in active or “problem-focused” coping (cf. Carver and
Connor-Smith, 2010). Individuals high in anxiety with relatively
high levels of dopamine should be more likely to overcome the
inhibition that accompanies anxiety, in order to explore the threat
in question, to explore possible solutions to the problem posed by
the threat, and to rapidly begin approaching some other goal if
their anxiety is great enough to produce complete passive avoid-
ance of the goal in question. On the whole, they should have better
outcomes following stress and should be less likely to transition
from anxiety to depression, but they should not necessarily feel
any less anxious about threat. Both noradrenaline and dopamine
are released in response to stress (Schultz, 2007; Robbins and
Arnsten, 2009), and the current theory proposes that proneness to
anxiety under stress is related to variation in noradrenergic func-
tion, whereas proneness to active coping vs. depressive response to
stress is related to variation in dopaminergic function. Under this
hypothesis, higher levels of dopaminergic activity will not make
people feel less anxious but will make them more likely to engage
in active coping (which may lead to better outcomes and hence,
indirectly, to less anxiety in the long run).
In a previous article, I proposed that the exploration associated
with Plasticity “is distinct from the kind of exploration, triggered
by threat that consists of vigilance and rumination designed to
scan for further threat” (DeYoung, 2010c, p 27), but I now suspect
that this statement needs to be qualified. Although it is likely to
be the noradrenaline associated with anxiety that primarily trig-
gers vigilance and rumination, the type of exploration associated
with Plasticity may nonetheless be evoked by threat, inasmuch
as the dopaminergic salience system is activated. In fact, it may
be precisely those high in Plasticity who are likely to be resilient
in the face of threat because increased dopaminergic activity will
incline them to engage in active coping. Further, if the dedication
of cognitive resources to exploring a problem (presumably driven
by the dopaminergic salience system) is experienced as rumina-
tion, then salience system activity might be positively related to
rumination specifically. Anxiety certainly interrupts the function
of the higher cognitive systems that are facilitated by the salience
coding system, but that does not necessarily mean it inhibits them
(Fales et al., 2008). It may simply redirect them to consider threat,
which would be consistent with the fact that the salience coding
system is triggered by unpredicted aversive stimuli.
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HYPOMANIA
While considering the role of dopamine in depression, it is
important to consider hypomania, a personality trait specifically
involved in bipolar or manic depression. Much as “depression”
can be used to describe a personality trait as well as the more
severe and typically more time-limited pathological episodes that
receive a clinical diagnosis of depression, “hypomania” can be
used to describe the milder and more stable personality trait that
constitutes risk for episodes of mania (the prefix “hypo” indi-
cates behavior less severe than full-blown mania). Mania is linked
to heightened exploratory behavior (Perry et al., 2010), posi-
tive emotion (Gruber, 2011), and dopaminergic function (Park
and Kang, 2012), and individuals described as hypomanic show
behavioral signs of frequent intense activation of both value and
salience systems, vividly illustrated by items from the Hypomanic
Personality Scale (Eckblad and Chapman, 1986): “I have often
been so excited about an involving project that I didn’t care about
eating or sleeping” (value); “Sometimes ideas and insights come
to me so fast that I cannot express them all” (salience).
Consistent with involvement of both divisions of the dopamin-
ergic system, trait hypomania is positively associated with both
Extraversion and Openness/Intellect (Meyer, 2002; Schalet et al.,
2011). Similarly, diagnosis of bipolar disorder is associated with
elevated Extraversion and Openness/Intellect, a very unusual pat-
tern among psychiatric disorders (Tackett et al., 2008). The link
to general dopaminergic function is additionally consistent with
the fact that mania has been linked to achievement striving
(Johnson, 2005). Finally, for the salience system to be hyperac-
tive in hypomania would be consistent with the former’s apparent
role in positive schizotypy, given that bipolar and schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders share considerable genetic risk (Craddock and
Owen, 2010). Whereas unipolar depression and depression as a
personality trait are posited to be associated with a general reduc-
tion in dopaminergic function, mania and hypomania are posited
to reflect a strong general increase in dopaminergic function.
The neurobiological dynamics that induce alternating episodes of
reduced and hyperactive dopaminergic function constitute one of
the most important topics for future research on bipolar disorder
and related traits.
SUMMARY OF DOPAMINERGIC TRAITS AND CONCLUSION
Table 2 presents the list of traits hypothesized to be influenced
by dopamine, noting whether each is hypothesized to be primar-
ily or secondarily associated with the value or salience coding
dopaminergic systems. A primary association indicates that vari-
ation in the particular dopaminergic subsystem is hypothesized
to be one of the largest determinants of variation in the trait.
A secondary association indicates that other biological systems
are hypothesized to determine more variance in the trait than
does the particular dopaminergic subsystem. The sign of the asso-
ciation indicates whether dopaminergic activity is positively or
negatively related to trait level. Activity in the value system influ-
ences traits that mainly involve behavioral exploration, whereas
activity in the salience system influences traits that mainly involve
cognitive exploration (taking a broad definition of “exploration”
as any process that functions to transform the unknown into the
known or vice versa). Traits linked to the value coding system
Table 2 | Traits hypothesized to be related to the value coding and
salience coding dopaminergic systems.
Value coding Salience coding









Apophenia (Positive schizotypy) ++
Industriousness (Perseverance) + +
Achievement striving ++ ++
Sensation seeking ++ (+)
Impulsivity (lack of premeditation) + −
Aggression (low Politeness) + −
Depression (facet of Withdrawal) − −
Hypomania ++ ++
++, Primary positive influence; +, Secondary positive influence; −, Secondary
negative influence; parentheses indicate association conditional on different
forms of the trait in question.
are related to Extraversion and its subtraits; traits linked to the
salience coding system are related to Openness/Intellect and its
subtraits. Aggression and some forms of impulsivity (particu-
larly lack of premeditation) are unusual in that they are posited
to be positively associated with activity in the value system but
negatively related to activity in the salience system.
The present theory has several implications for research on
the role of dopamine in personality. First, the difference between
value and salience systems clarifies one major reason why not
every measured parameter of dopaminergic function must be
related to every dopaminergic trait. Some traits will be related
to parameters specific to one or the other system. Second, even
within each system, different parameters may be related to dif-
ferent traits (because of the complexity of each system and their
interactions with each other). For example, a dopaminergic value-
system parameter that predicts sensation seeking need not nec-
essarily predict Extraversion. What should be the case, however,
is that some parameter of the value system could be found that
is related to both Extraversion and sensation seeking—because
the theory presumes that any trait influenced by dopamine will
be related to Extraversion or Openness/Intellect partly through
dopaminergic mechanisms. Because of themany different param-
eters that may vary in the dopaminergic system, Extraversion and
Openness/Intellect need not account for (or fully mediate) every
association of some other trait with dopaminergic function, but
any trait associated with dopaminergic function should be associ-
ated with Extraversion and/or Openness/Intellect or one of their
subtraits.
Because Extraversion and Openness/Intellect are considered
to be the primary manifestations of dopaminergic function
in personality, one should always test whether an association
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between a dopaminergic parameter and some other personality
trait is mediated by these two traits, and particularly by their
Assertiveness and Intellect aspects, which are hypothesized to
be most strongly related to dopamine. Further, when demon-
strating an association of any phenomenon with Extraversion or
Assertiveness, one should always test whether the effect might be
due to variance shared with Intellect, and vice versa. For example,
any positive association of working memory capacity or intelli-
gence with Extraversion is likely to be merely an artifact, due to
the association of these cognitive abilities with Intellect (DeYoung
et al., 2005, 2009, 2013b).
The list of traits in Table 2 is intended to be reasonably com-
prehensive. Some of these traits may be fractionated further into
facets, but all facet-level traits related to dopamine are likely to
be facets of one of the traits in the list. If additional traits are
identified that cannot be considered a facet of one of the traits
in Table 2, they should nonetheless be related to Extraversion
or Openness/Intellect. One might predict, for example, that
sociosexual orientation (i.e., desire for many short-term vs. few
long-term sexual relationships; Simpson and Gangestad, 1991a)
is likely to be associated with dopaminergic function. Whether
or not this trait qualifies as a facet of Extraversion, it is sub-
stantially correlated with Extraversion (Simpson and Gangestad,
1991b) and seems likely to be influenced by the dopaminergic
value system.
One should not fall victim to the jangle fallacy and assume that
because a scale has a different name it cannot be measuring one
of the traits already on the list. For example, the MPQ, which is
often used in research on dopamine, contains a Social Potency
that is a good measure of Assertiveness (DeYoung et al., 2013b).
Similarly, Novelty Seeking and Excitement Seeking are not listed
because they are subsumed by Sensation Seeking.
Another important caveat is that variations in the dopamin-
ergic system are not presumed to be solely responsible for
variation in any of the traits listed here. Even traits like
Assertiveness and Intellect that are hypothesized to be strongly
influenced by dopaminergic function are undoubtedly influ-
enced by non-dopaminergic neurobiological parameters as well.
Further, because multiple biological systems will influence most,
if not all, traits, the mere fact that a trait is associated with
Extraversion or Openness/Intellect does not guarantee that it is
influenced by dopamine. Some other biological system or process
may be responsible for the trait associations in question.
In recent years, the most prominent theory of the role of
dopamine in personality has linked it to Extraversion, reward
sensitivity, and approach behavior (Depue and Collins, 1999).
Recognition of the distinction between the value and salience cod-
ing systems provides a coherent framework for understanding
how traits related to cognitive function, like Openness/Intellect
and positive schizotypy, might also be related to dopamine. The
most important premise for the development of a unified the-
ory of dopaminergic function is that information has innate
reward value, just as do food, warmth, sex, affiliation, and status.
This premise allows the identification of exploration—cognition
and behavior motivated by the incentive reward value of
uncertainty—as the basic function of all dopaminergic activity. In
turn, this unity of function may help to explain why Extraversion
(sensitivity to specific rewards) and Openness/Intellect (sensitiv-
ity to the reward value of information) are sufficiently corre-
lated to allow characterization of a higher-order Plasticity factor.
Global variations in dopaminergic tone across the value and
salience systems are posited to produce variation in the gen-
eral exploratory tendency reflected in individual differences in
Plasticity.
This theory about the nature of dopaminergic function and
its role in personality is an extension of the entropy model of
uncertainty (EMU; Hirsh et al., 2012), which characterizes anxi-
ety as a response to uncertainty, defined as psychological entropy.
What the initial presentation of EMU left out was an account of
the fact that uncertainty is not only innately threatening, but also
innately promising (Peterson, 1999). Uncertainty or the unknown
is the only class of stimuli to have this inherently ambivalent
motivational significance (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). A fully
elaborated EMU can account not only for the response to entropy
as a threat but also for the response to entropy as a potential
source of reward. Traits related to dopamine reflect variation in
the ways that individuals respond to the incentive reward value of
uncertainty.
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